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Action Potentials:
Extrapolating an Ideology from the 
Anonymous Hacker Socio-Political 
Movement (A Qualitative Meta-Analysis)
ABSTRACT
An ideology is defined as a set of ideas that “explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people un-
derstand their place in society, and provides a program for social and political action” (Ball & Dagger, 
2011, p. 4). As such, these concepts underpin the actions of various groups and organizations, includ-
ing that of the Anonymous hacker group, which professes no ideology or creed. Rather, the group has 
styled itself as a kind of anarchic global brain connected by various spaces on the Internet. This work 
explores four main data streams to extrapolate the group’s ideology: the current socio-political context 
of hacking and hacktivism; the group’s self-definition (through its professed values); the group’s actions 
(through the “propaganda of the deed”); and the insights of others about the group This chapter defines 
the socio-technical context of this Anonymous hacker socio-political movement, which draws ideas from 
the Hacker Manifesto 2.0, which suggests the advent of a new economic system with the new technologi-
cal vectors (mediums of communication). This movement is apparently pushing forth the advent of a 
new information regime in which the abstraction of ideas adds a “surplus” economic value that may be 
tapped. Styled as fighters against government tyranny, they are pushing hard against an international 
regime of intellectual property and information control by governments and corporations. This is being 
published in the spirit that (some) information wants to be free and that there is a value in direct discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
Especially in our age of globalized communica-
tions, no amount of force can kill an infectious 
inspiration—a potential source of countermo-
bilization, especially when it is spread through 
informal networks operating below the radar of 
state bureaucracy (Kurth Cronin, 2003, p. 143).
We are Anonymous. We are Legion. We do not 
forgive. We do not forget. Expect us (Anonymous). 
Whatever code we hack, be it programming lan-
guage, poetic language, math or music, curves or 
colourings, we create the possibility of new things 
entering the world. Not always great things, or 
even good things, but new things. In art, in sci-
ence, in philosophy and culture, in any production 
of knowledge where data can be gathered, where 
information can be extracted from it, and where in 
that information new possibilities for the world are 
produced, there are hackers hacking the new out 
of the old. While hackers create these new worlds, 
we do not possess them. That which we create is 
mortgaged to others, and to the interests of others, 
to states and corporations who control the means 
for making worlds we alone discover. We do not 
own what we produce—it owns us (Wark, 2004). 
The Anonymous hacker group has presented 
itself in the public media as an amorphous leader-
less group that is all-pervasive but also nowhere. 
Its role is to keep governments accountable by 
restricting their instincts against totalitarian con-
trol (of information, of privacy, and of individual 
rights of association). It has a masked leader who 
is like the proverbial Everyman. It argues for a 
kind of individual and group freedoms that may 
be achieved with hacking, and it is guided by 
some of the ideas of the modern age—such as 
the idea that “information wants to be free.” Its 
media optics are self-aware and self-promoting, 
an effort to reach out to their constituents and to 
win over more powerful allies to their cause. As 
a so-called self-organizing group with libertarian 
and anarchist leanings, Anonymous draws from 
The Hacker Manifesto and other artifacts of the 
electronic age. An ideology (or “policy package”) 
is critical to a group because it is what is used 
to recruit group members and to rationalize the 
group’s existence and its actions in the world. An 
ideology is defined as a set of ideas that “explains 
and evaluates social conditions, helps people 
understand their place in society, and provides a 
program for social and political action” (Ball & 
Dagger, 2011, p. 4). Ironically, Anonymous claims 
to have no ideology but does act on some core ideas 
(this strategy may be a part of the group’s messag-
ing and a kind of strategic ambiguity to make it 
more acceptable to many self-identifying members 
who opt-in on particular operations). Others have 
observed that this organization has “no coherent 
ideology, but a track record of considerable dam-
age” (Sengupta, 2012). Their expressed values are 
a body of sentiments more than a comprehensive 
worldview. The organization may be conceptual-
ized as self-organizing, with members opting in 
and out, and animating ideas capable of emerging 
from any sector is this dispersed organization 
(in the study of organizations, a lack of a strong 
core ideology means lesser abilities to maintain 
followership beyond the near-term).
While the organization claims not to have 
any ideology or creed [which may be part of an 
approach of “strategic ambiguity” (leaving open 
a broad range of options by not committing to a 
particular approach) to avoid alienating potential 
followers], this chapter takes the approach that 
“character reveals” over time. It is wholly pos-
sible to reverse-engineer at least a partial ideology 
based on the group’s actions and public statements. 
For a global-level group with no figurehead, no 
charismatic spokesperson (and an anti-leader and 
anti-celebrity ethic), no dramatis personae (except 
a mask), and computer synthesized voiceovers of 
videos, this group all the more needs something 
to appeal to virtual followers:
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Although there is no authority figure or any lead-
ing group in Anonymous, there is ‘policy, ethical 
sensibilities, and norms, all of which develop over 
time and often continuously formed and reformed 
in reaction to historical events’ (Coleman, as cited 
in Ohhashi, 2011, p. 5). 
Its international brand consists of its logo, its 
press coverage, and its ideas. The ideas then have 
to trigger its members, who ostensibly could hail 
from anywhere in the world. Virtually every public 
message, digital attack, legal action, ad private 
security firm research into the group leaves some 
publicly accessible residual trail. This chapter 
examines the mass media messages (YouTube™ 
videos, signs, and official statements) designed 
to rally supporters and educate the wider pub-
lics about their concerns, and the “propaganda 
of the deed” of this organization to extrapolate 
this group’s ideology. Further, in the spirit of 
the 360-degree analysis, this group will also be 
analyzed for its ideology based on the research 
of those from security firms, targets, law enforce-
ment, authors, former members, and other entities. 
This assumes that self-definitions are necessarily 
limited and potentially biased. Creating a more 
well rounded sense of the organization may result 
in a more insightful extrapolated ideology. Figure 
1, “A Recursive Relationship between Ideology 
and Actions” posits a relationship between pro-
fessed thoughts and actions.
Ideologies have shaped human conceptualiza-
tions of the world and their actions within it. 
According to Ball and Dagger (2011), there are 
four basic functions of an ideology in making 
sense of the world: “(1) explanatory, (2) evalua-
tive, (3) orientative, and (4) programmatic func-
tions” (Ball & Dagger, 2011, p. 4). An ideology 
explains the state of the world, sets standards for 
evaluating social conditions, orientates individu-
als with an identity, and sets forth a program of 
action. Most ideologies claim to defend a freedom 
(Ball & Dagger, 2011, p. 9); they are so-called 
liberating ideologies. MacCallum’s triadic 
model of freedom shows how ideologies concep-
tualize an agent, an obstacle, and a goal, with 
ideologies enabling the achievements of particu-
lar goals. Because people tend to sense-make and 
are activated by ideas, ideologies are especially 
critical to understand. In human history, large 
social movements and political regimes have been 
harnessed and led for generations based on the 
power of organizing ideas—from democracy to 
imperialism to socialism to fascism/totalitarian-
ism, and other forms. If ideas spark people to 
action and risk-taking (if they have repercussions), 
the motivating ideas that shape an “authorizing 
environment” (a context in which certain actions 
are considered normal and acceptable, but which 
would not be allowable in other contexts) should 
be understood. In light of the research that people 
strive to behave in a moral way even in “anony-
mous, one-shot interactions” (Bénabou & Tirole, 
2011, p. 805) and in individual and collective 
behavior (p. 846), it is important to know the 
limits of moral action as conceptualized by the 
group, particularly one that sees itself as being 
revolutionary and altruistic, such as Anonymous. 
The portrayal of a group as altruistic to its con-
stituents limits that group’s actions; any perceived 
hypocrisy may result in the loss of supporters or 
even a backlash. Further, anger predicts offensive 
action tendencies within a dissident group, so it 
is important to know what may spark the group 
to action (in terms of contravention to the group’s 
identity or ideals).
An ideology is not a static set of ideas. New 
ideologies are often seen as reacting to other 
Figure 1. A recursive relationship between ideol-
ogy and actions
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competing worldviews, other explanations of real-
ity. A political ideology evolves over time, and it 
evolves as the ideas are applied to the world. As 
changing leaders head up particular groups, the 
membership evolves, and contemporaneous hacker 
and hacktivist organizations (like Wikileaks) exist, 
ideologies will be re-framed and re-interpreted. As 
long as the ideas in an ideology have relevance to 
particular followers, these ideas will continue to 
free-ride humans as memes, and people will sup-
port a particular movement for a time as they are 
sparked by ideas. This means that this particular 
chapter may be accurate only for a particular time 
as the group evolves.
Extrapolating an ideology is important because 
this conceptual model may provide a sense of the 
group’s motivations and potential actions, which 
are then only limited by the group’s imagination, 
resources, and capabilities. Knowing a group’s 
ideology may aid in terms of predictive analytics 
or projecting into the future. It may also aid in 
interactions with the group because those engag-
ing them may be able to connect around shared 
ideas. To qualify these assertions, this chapter does 
not suggest any determinism between ideologies 
and actions. Certainly, there are many in-world 
examples of discrepancies between what is pro-
fessed and what is actually believed and acted on 
in organizations (Argyris, 1993). What is being 
asserted here is that analyzing an ideology may 
indicate an organization’s random walk (a general 
probabilistic trajectory with degrees of indeter-
minacy and uncertainty).
To infer Anonymous’ ideology, the author will 
look at four main areas:
• The current socio-political context of hack-
ing and hacktivism;
• The group’s self-definition (through its 
professed values);
• The group’s actions (through the “propa-
ganda of the deed”); and
• The insights of others about the group.
The Limits of Publicly 
Available Information
Given the secretive nature of the organization 
and the severe limits of the public information 
available (with much of it sourced in inaccessible 
ways), this systematic meta-analysis involves some 
severe limits (even though the author strove for 
comprehensiveness).
The limited information comes from state-
ments by the organization (self-definition), the 
publicized actions of the group, and the insights 
of others that have varying relationships to the 
group. Most of the research involves hacktivism 
(hacker + activism) actions that have occurred 
over discrete (vs. continuous) time.
These include a range of activities that fits the 
traditional concept of civil disobedience but then 
also range into the unlawful. In Figure 2, “Hack-
tivism Range,” this concept is demonstrated with 
hacktivists working within their rights (broadly 
speaking) to the left but crossing the Rubicon into 
potential illegality to the right. As Kreimer (2001) 
Figure 2. Hacktivism range
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has observed, insurgent social movements have 
evolved their tactics based on the technologies of 
the Internet. It may be assumed that ideologically 
driven groups (as others) will experiment, reflect 
on the effects of their operations, and continually 
learn and improve their methods. Attacks that end 
with good results—respectable damage and plenty 
of media attention—may be repeated; attacks that 
resulted in their own loss of reputation or effec-
tiveness as an organization may well be avoided.
Denning (2003) describes the threats to net-
worked systems:
These threats involve operations that compromise, 
damage, degrade, disrupt, deny, and destroy in-
formation stored on computer networks or that 
target network infrastructure. They include com-
puter intrusions and the use of network ‘sniffers’ 
to eavesdrop on network communications. They 
include the use of malicious software, namely, 
computer viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. 
They include denial-of-service attacks that halt 
or disrupt the operation of networked computers, 
usually by flooding them with traffic, and Web 
defacements that replace a site’s home page with 
cyber graffiti, false information, and statements 
of protest (p. 91). 
How the ideology is expressed in action reveals 
much about an organization because it is a kind 
of “costly signaling” beyond the “cheap talk” of 
ideology. An organization emphasizes its seri-
ousness by putting it efforts where its apparent 
ideologies lie.
Simply because prior attacks have manifested 
in these known forms does not suggest that fu-
ture forms of hacktivism extremes will remain 
at this level. Security experts suggest that early 
skirmishes may morph into more serious forms 
of attacks. There is certainly potential for escala-
tions of strategies and attacks, combinations and 
re-combinations of various strategies and tools, 
and changes in attitudes, thinking, and additional 
learning. For virtual organizations that can crowd-
source, it is possible that new techniques may 
evolve from any part of the loosely organized 
organization. Spin-off groups in various countries 
or regions may break off and conduct attacks on 
their own based on their interests and hacktivism 
skill sets.
Some security officials in the U.S. have even 
suggested that “world havoc” could ensue with 
impacts on major sectors of the economy of the 
shut-down of the power grid and other critical 
infrastructures (defined by Milone as “commu-
nications, power, transportation, banking, water 
supply, and public institutions” (2003, p. 75). A 
FawkesSecurity account promised that Anony-
mous would target “national infrastructure” and 
push for “global financial meltdown” in forthcom-
ing “Lulzworthy” attacks (Lee, 2012).
What is not currently known publicly is legion: 
who the leaders of this group are, the conversa-
tions that may have happened off-line or in other 
spaces which have gone unobserved (except by the 
principals), the various technological and social 
engineering tools used in various hacktivist acts, 
and then plenty of “unknown unknowns”.
Law enforcement has enormous traceback 
(the identification of where individuals entered 
the Internet and the paths they took, including 
through various bouncepoints, to arrive at a certain 
computer) and forensics capabilities, which are 
beyond that of a typical general researcher; they 
can track hacker actions in virtual audit trails into 
the ether. [Law enforcement gets involved when 
there are clear indicators of hackers having crossed 
the line into criminality in their vigilante actions, 
including unlawful access to private Intellectual 
Property (IP), illegal interception of information, 
impersonation of another, unlawful use of telecom-
munication equipment, forgery, theft of property, 
breaking into private systems and networks, 
violations of privacy, the making of threats, and 
launching Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS, 
or pronounced D-dos) attacks and SQL (pro-
nounced “sequel”) injection attacks on databases. 
In recent accounts, law enforcement agencies in 
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many of the world’s developed nations have been 
establishing bodies of laws against cybercrimes 
and putting into place technological structures 
that enable law enforcement to meet evidentiary 
standards in the collection of digital information 
while protecting citizens’ privacy and other First 
Amendment rights (Schwerha IV, 2004). Law 
enforcement, even independent of the hackers 
engaging in criminal activities, has been mapping 
hackers to understand their evolving capabilities 
(Glenny, 2011). Beyond a basic text analysis and 
access to publicly available information, this 
researcher only has access to publicly available 
and published information. The Anonymous orga-
nization itself may be maintaining its own history 
and “documentation.” If that is even done, there 
is no access to the organization’s internal record 
keeping. Given the limitations, this work will 
contribute in a small way to an understanding of a 
loosely coupled organization that has been around 
since 2006 and has been active and evolving ever 
since. The organization came about as a gather-
ing of anonymous individuals interacting in the 
4chan message board (Mansfield-Devine, 2011).
This board, with some 7 million regular users, 
is known for the ephemerality of its messages, with 
most threads spending “just five seconds on the 
first page and less than five minutes on the site 
before expiring” (with an average of 3.9 minutes 
as the median lifespan) based on in situ research 
over a two-week period in 2010 that involved the 
collection of 5,576,096 posts in 482,559 threads 
in their dataset (Bernstein, Monroy-Hernández, 
Harry, Andre, Panovich, and Vargas, 2011, p. 
1). Further, 90% of posts made on the 4chan /b/ 
were fully anonymous users with identity signals 
“adopted and discarded at will” (p. 1). Its contents 
are often profane, pornographic, and anarchic; its 
users have evolved their own shorthand language, 
with its own underground value system (anti-
authority, pro-individual, pro-lulz, and paranoid. 
Immersing in this culture enables users to try to 
influence the crowd, but it apparently involves 
exposure to being cognitively hacked.
The original “rules” of this space are known to 
be free-form and full of the 4chan Anon’s “memes” 
collected as the “47 Rules of the Internet,” with 
some of the famous ones reading: “In the Internet 
all girls are men and all kids are undercover FBI 
agents,” (Rule #29) and “Anonymous is legion” 
(Rule #4). Some other parts of the rules suggest 
some features of the “hive mind”: “Any topic can 
be easily turned into something totally unrelated” 
(Rule # 26) and “All your carefully picked argu-
ments can easily be ignored” (Rule #11) (These 
rules have since morphed and evolved).
A Short Note on Semantics
To begin, it will be important to define a “hacker”. 
The traditional meaning of the term referred to 
those who were expert in computing machines 
and systems.
Crackers are those who break into computers in 
order to achieve destructive ends. Though the 
media will often confuse the two terms, hackers 
are very different. “Hacker” was originally a term 
that was coined to represent an individual’s deep 
understanding of computer systems and networks. 
Hackers use their skills to invent, modify, and refine 
these systems, often creatively using computers 
to achieve a goal for which the system was not 
originally intended (Levesque, 2006, p. 1203). 
In the present day, the term has evolved to 
include the work of those who break into com-
puting systems for various aims, potentially more 
like the original meaning of “crackers.” For the 
purposes of this work, though, the term “hacker” 
is the one used in the present day and not the 
original meaning.
Hacktivism, or hacker + activism, if it were 
to follow the rules of “civil disobedience” should 
follow the following general guidelines:
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• No damage done to persons or property.
• Non-violent.
• Not for personal profit.
• Ethical Motivation: i.e., The strong con-
viction that a law is unjust, unfair, or to the 
extreme detriment of the common good.
• Willingness to accept personal responsi-
bility for outcome of actions (Manion & 
Goodrum, 2000, p. 15).
In cyberspace, hacktivism has taken many 
forms, which go well beyond this civil disobedi-
ence ethos, and certain hacktivist ideologies may 
justify a greater sense of extremism. Further, 
several researchers have noted that what may be 
considered hacktivism by some may be considered 
cyberterrorism by others (Denning, 1999).
A HACKING AND HACKTIVISM 
IDEOLOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE?
The exercise of “cyber power” then refers to the 
ability to obtain preferred outcomes through “use 
of the electronically interconnected information 
resources of the cyber domain” (Nye, 2010, pp. 
3-4). To build on the physical and virtual dimen-
sions of cyber power conceptualization of Nye, 
Anonymous has the capability to deploy hard 
power using information instruments within 
cyber space (intra cyber space) as well as soft 
power (the effect of persuasion through mes-
saging) and by setting norms and standards of 
hacktivist civil disobedience. Outside of cyber 
space, they use information instruments and the 
social networks to promote a “public diplomacy 
campaign to sway opinion” (Nye, 2010, p. 5). In 
terms of physical instruments, the organization 
takes advantage of open-source infrastructures 
for intercommunications—within and outside of 
cyberspace—in order to share information and to 
coordinate actions. Their concentrations of power 
are mostly soft power, and their hard power is 
in the realm of information instruments used in 
“intra cyber space.” Nye defines the three faces 
of power in cyber space:
1st Face: “A makes B do what B would initially 
otherwise not do”.
2nd Face: “Agenda control: A precludes B’s choice 
by exclusion of B’s strategies”.
3rd Face: “A shapes B’s preferences so some 
strategies are never even considered”.
Based on Nye’s definitions, Anonymous has 
some hard power in the 1st Face because of their 
Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks and their soft 
power in being able to potentially “change initial 
preferences of hackers.” In the 3rd Face, Anony-
mous also has the ability to use information in a soft 
power way to “create preferences” among hackers 
and to affect what he calls “norms of revulsion” 
(such as in their stance against child pornography) 
(Nye, 2010, p. 7). This is a type of relational power 
in terms of how the organization interacts with 
other entities in society. Their capability set then 
involves both soft and hard power, with a focus on 
the first. Their propagandas of the deed do indeed 
convey a sense of threat to some entities, which 
may not want to tangle with the hackers and risk 
having information loss and public humiliation. Fi-
nally, Nye discusses the Relative Power Resources 
of Actors in the Cyber Domain (Nye, 2010, p. 
10) which may illuminate Anonymous’s relative 
advantages vs. the capabilities of the entrenched 
entities of government and private industries. He 
shows governments as having vulnerabilities such 
as high dependence on “easily disrupted complex 
systems, political stability, reputational losses” and 
organizations and highly structured networks as 
being vulnerable to “legal, intellectual property 
theft, systems disruption, reputation loss (name 
and shame)” and lightly structured networks (like 
Anonymous—author note) being vulnerable to 
“legal and illegal coercion by governments and 
organizations if caught” but having “low cost of 
investment for entry, virtual anonymity and ease 
of exit, (and) asymmetrical vulnerability compared 
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to governments and large organizations (Nye, 
2010, p. 10).
If Anonymous has anything like an ideological 
superstructure that scaffolds a worldview, which 
it denies, it could partially draw on some aspects 
of a manifesto (a public declaration of political 
principles and values) from an external sources. 
The McKenzie Wark version of The Hacker 
Manifesto (2004), which illuminates the social 
relations of production and the material forces 
of production, draws heavily on revolutionary 
Marxist ideas (and particularly the Hegelian no-
tion of the master-slave dialectic) but ultimately 
sees the socialist and communist conclusions as 
ill-informed. The “false consciousness” of people 
in this conceptualization relates to the ownership 
and access to information—which should be free in 
a kind of gift economy, and the role of the “hacker 
class” is to build towards a gift economy utopia 
by setting information free. That’s the essential 
dialectic, and much of it does apply to the work 
of Anonymous.
Beginning with Two 
Hacker Manifestos
The first “The Hacker Manifesto”/“Conscience 
of a Hacker” written by The Mentor (aka Loyd 
Blankenship) in Jan. 8, 1986, reads like a dialogue 
between a hacker of a younger generation who 
has finally found his niche in computers against 
an individual from the establishment with his 
“three-piece psychology and 1950’s technobrain.” 
Here, the teenaged hacker is cursed by the older 
generations as being an underachiever, but in the 
meantime, the hacker is coming into his own. 
The establishment thinks, “Damn kid. Tying up 
the phone line again. They’re all alike...” but the 
hackers are finally coming into their own: “This 
is our world now... the world of the electron and 
the switch, the beauty of the baud.
We make use of a service already existing 
without paying for what could be dirt-cheap if 
it wasn’t run by profiteering gluttons, and you 
call U.S. criminals. We explore... and you call us 
criminals. We seek after knowledge... and you call 
us criminals. We exist without skin color, without 
nationality, without religious bias... and you call 
us criminals. You build atomic bombs, you wage 
wars, you murder, cheat, and lie to us and try to 
make us believe it’s for our own good, yet we’re 
the criminals.” This serves as a celebration of a 
newly discovered power and a kind of rebellious 
shaking the fist at “the Man”.
A more fine-tuned and informative “A Hacker 
Manifesto” (v. 4) comes from McKenzie Wark, 
and this offers a reasoned economic model behind 
hacking and the definition of hackers as their own 
class. In this conceptualization, everything in 
the world has its own abstraction, what is called 
“double spooking.” Wark writes: “The fortunes 
of states and armies, companies and communi-
ties depend on it. All contending classes—the 
landlords and farmers, the workers and capital-
ists—revere yet fear the relentless abstraction of 
the world on which their fortunes yet depend. All 
the classes but one. The hacker class.” Hackers are 
a sort of class that has “to hack itself into manifest 
existence as itself”.
The hacker class, by identifying the latent 
abstractions of immaterial information underlying 
the world, creates a kind of surplus or additional 
value. Their new hacks supersede old ones, and 
it devalues the older ones…so hacking is seen as 
creating new information out of existing informa-
tion. Such discoveries are a way of creating other 
potentials. It is in this abstracting of information 
that hackers run up against the ruling class that 
“owns the material means of extracting or dis-
tributing information, or with a producing class 
that extracts and distributes. The class interest of 
hackers lies in freeing information from its material 
constraints,” writes Wark. Those who benefit from 
intellectual property as a means of production are 
termed the “vectorialist class,” aka “the emergent 
ruling class of our town” or those who control the 
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“vectors along which information is abstracted” 
(“vectors” may be understood as “mediums” or 
any methods by which information moves):
The vectorialist class is waging an intensive 
struggle to dispossess hackers of their intellectual 
property. Patents and copyrights all end up in 
the hands, not of their creators, but of the vecto-
ralist class that owns the means of realising the 
value of these abstractions. The vectoralist class 
struggles to monopolise abstraction. Hackers find 
themselves dispossessed both individually, and 
as a class. Hackers come piecemeal to struggle 
against the particular forms in which abstraction 
is commodified and made into the private property 
of the vectoralist class. Hackers come to struggle 
collectively against the usurious charges the vec-
toralists extort for access to the information that 
hackers collectively produce, but that vectoralists 
collectively come to own. Hackers come as a class 
to recognise their class interest is best expressed 
through the struggle to free the production of 
abstraction not just from the particular fetters of 
this or that form of property, but to abstract the 
form of property itself (Wark, 2004). 
Hackers’ abilities to abstract the world enable 
them to “break the shackles holding hacking fast to 
outdated and regressive class interests.” The work 
of hackers may push human societies forward to 
“liberate productive and inventive resources from 
the myth of scarcity.”
In a sense, the hacker becomes his or her hack 
based on the circular language in the manifesto: 
“The hack produces a production of a new kind, 
which has as its result a singular and unique prod-
uct, and a singular and unique producer. Every 
hacker is at one and the same time producer and 
product of the hack, and emerges in its singular-
ity as the memory of the hack as process” (Wark, 
2004). The self is created through self-actions. 
The discussion of the surplus created by the hack 
offers a potential for a fresh contribution.
The hack produces both a useful and a useless 
surplus, although the usefulness of any surplus is 
socially and historically determined. The useful 
surplus goes into expanding the realm of freedom 
wrested from necessity. The useless surplus is the 
surplus of freedom itself, the margin of free pro-
duction unconstrained by production for necessity 
(Wark, 2004). 
In this Hacker Manifesto, Wark portrays the 
hacker classes as working alongside the so-called 
producing classes to gain freedom from class 
domination. Wark writes: “The ruling class 
subordinates the hack to the production of forms 
of production that may be harnessed to the en-
hancement of class power, and the suppression or 
marginalisation of other forms of hacking. What 
the producing classes—farmers, workers, and 
hackers—have in common is an interest in freeing 
production from its subordination to ruling classes 
who turn production into the production of new 
necessities, who wrest slavery from surplus.” In 
direct contravention of the Communist approach 
to centralizing the instruments of production in 
the power of the state, thus resulting in a new rul-
ing class, hackers diffuse the power of the ruling 
class by challenging their primacy. Corporations 
are seen to monopolize intellectual property:
Patents and brands—and the means of reproduc-
ing their value—the vectors of communication. 
The privatisation of information becomes the 
dominant, rather than a subsidiary, aspect of 
commodified life. As private property advances 
from land to capital to information, property it-
self becomes more abstract. As capital frees land 
from its spatial fixity, information as property 
frees capital from its fixity in a particular object 
(Wark, 2004). 
In The Hacker Manifesto, hackers have a 
value to each successive ruling class because of 
their ability to abstract information into property, 
which has value. Hackers are seen as uniquely 
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positioned to affect the world in a positive way, 
“when freedom from necessity and from class 
domination appears on the horizon as a possibil-
ity,” which suggests a kind of possible utopia. 
To achieve this utopia, hackers have to engage in 
their activities “free from any constraint that is 
not self imposed.” Further, any information cre-
ated no longer falls under “the artifice of scarcity 
once freed from commodification”—and so can 
be used and re-used without artificial limits as 
a non-rivalrous good. Wark posits an idealized 
“social space of open and free gift exchange” in 
contrast to commodified and limited proprietary 
use of information by the vectoralists who are 
depicted as “parasitic and superfluous” and who 
are seen as dispossessing others by claiming own-
ership rights. Further, vectors are deployed in the 
world in highly uneven ways due to political and 
economic factors, not technological ones, accord-
ing to this argument. In The Hacker Manifesto, 
Wark embeds a call to action:
The hacker class seeks the liberation of the vector 
from the reign of the commodity, but not to set it 
indiscriminately free. Rather, to subject it to col-
lective and democratic development. The hacker 
class can release the virtuality of the vector only 
in principle. It is up to an alliance of all the pro-
ductive classes to turn that potential to actuality, 
to organise themselves subjectively, and use the 
available vectors for a collective and subjective 
becoming (Wark, 2004). 
The work continues and argues that formal 
education promotes the existing power structure 
and is a kind of “slavery”—which enchains the 
mind and makes it a resource for “class power”.
Vectoralists turn education into a “profitable 
industry.” A true hacker pursues “the pure liberty 
of knowledge,” not education. His or her true and 
foremost concern is “a free circulation of infor-
mation, this being the necessary condition for the 
renewed statement of the hack.” The manifesto 
allows for the hacker class to view the hack as 
a kind of property or “as something from which 
a source of income may be derived that gives 
the hacker some independence from the ruling 
classes.” The freeing of information will unleash 
potential that would not be possible otherwise. 
Hackers have a high calling to free the world from 
the domination of those who hold proprietary 
control over information.
The arrest of the free flow of information means 
the enslavement of the world to the interests of 
those who profit from information’s scarcity, the 
vectoral class. The enslavement of information 
means the enslavement of its producers to the 
interests of its owners. It is the hacker class that 
taps the virtuality of information, but it is the vec-
toralist class that owns and controls the means of 
production of information on an industrial scale. 
Privatising culture, education and communication 
as commodified content, distorts and deforms its 
free development, and prevents the very concept of 
its freedom from its own free development. While 
information remains subordinated to ownership, it 
is not possible for its producers to freely calculate 
their interests, or to discover what the true freedom 
of information might potentially produce in the 
world (Wark, 2004). 
In this worldview, the state itself strives to 
control or “police” representations. In that light, 
“hacking recognises no artificial scarcity, no of-
ficial licence, no credentialing police force other 
than that composed by the gift economy among 
hackers themselves.” In other words, the only law 
that hackers face is unto themselves. Hackers live 
then in a state of anarchy without recognition of 
any nation-state’s oppressive role. This organiza-
tion has called for “cyberspace independence from 
world governments” as a goal.
In a global class struggle, Wark points to a 
regressive and Luddite politics that focuses on the 
past and on national borders. “The other form is 
the progressive politics of movement. The politics 
of movement seeks to accelerate toward an un-
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known future. It seeks to use international flows 
of information, trade, or activism as the eclectic 
means for struggling for new sources of wealth 
or liberty that overcomes the limitations imposed 
by national coalitions,” writes Wark, and hackers 
are moving towards this unknown future.
The master narrative of hackers is argued by 
some to be an extension of the radical ethos of 
labour struggles, which justified various acts of 
sabotage to benefit workers oppressed by man-
agement. Yet, the politics of hacking involves “a 
synthesis of many irreconcilable things” (Da-
fermos & Söderberg, 2009, p. 56). Johns (2009) 
suggests that present-day hacking (and free data 
haven endeavors) is part of the anti-patenting and 
pro-piracy approaches of 1960s pirate radio and 
the ideologies of Friedrich Hayek and Ronald 
Coase (p. 46).
CONSTRAINING HACKER ETHICS
The “hacker ethic,” according to Steven Levy 
in Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution 
(1984) consists of six basic tenets.
1.  Access to computers and anything that might 
teach you something about the way the world 
works should be unlimited and total. Always 
yield to the hands-on imperative!
2.  All information should be free.
3.  Mis t r us t  au thor i ty  and  promote 
decentralization.
4.  Hackers should be judged by their hacking, 
not bogus criteria such as degrees, age, race, 
or position.
5.  You can create art and beauty on a computer.
6.  Computers can change your life for the better 
(Hacker Ethic, 2012).
Kizza observes the following additional ethics: 
“Hackers reject the notion that ‘businesses’ are the 
only groups entitled to access and use of modern 
technology. Hacking is a major weapon in the 
fight against encroaching computer technology. 
The high cost of computing equipment is beyond 
the means of most hackers, which results in the 
perception that hacking and phreaking are the only 
recourse to spreading computer literacy to the 
masses” (2009, p. 119), which suggests pro-social 
motives. Ramsdell (2011) cites Palmås and von 
Busch in their definitions of central motivations 
of hackers—to promote access to technology and 
transparent knowledge about it, to empower com-
puter users, to decentralize control and to create 
beauty and exceed limitations (p. 5).
Who are Hackers? Hacktivists?
In his cyber-mystical work, Ramsdell writes rap-
turously of hackers:
The sublime is a meta-narrative for transcendence, 
often rapture, and most importantly, the experience 
of coming abreast of the limits and looking back to 
see the world anew. The connection to boundary 
exploration is easily made to hackers, who are 
the colonists—but really more like the rugged fur 
trappers, cowboys, and outlaws—of the manifest 
destiny of cyberspace. It is they who will see the 
digital sublime in its purest, jaggedness form 
before it is simplified and aestheticized for future 
waves to ogle. It is there—emergence dynamics 
flowering out of networked e-communities, spon-
taneous generation and blindingly rapid evolution 
of memes, whole vast swaths of the unknown. The 
myth lives and its pioneer is rewarded (Ramsdell, 
2011, p. 11). 
Known hackers have been predominantly male, 
in part reflecting the male dominance in the IT 
profession (Taylor, 1999, p. 33; as cited in Kleen, 
2001, pp. 2-46). Hacker teams tend to work in a 
“loose hierarchy” of 4-7 members with unique 
skill sets. Those who are successful tend to be “of 
above average intelligence, imaginative, curious, 
and inventive;” they are capable of conceptual-
izing technological capabilities that the original 
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technologies were not designed to do. Many are 
loners, and many have an addiction to computing. 
They “believe they can do anything they want” 
and enjoy a sense of “power and achievement 
through the systems they have hacked” (Chantler, 
1996, p. 62; as cited in Kleen, 2001, pp. 2-54). 
Malicious hackers may be motivated by a range of 
individual motivations—but these include curios-
ity, challenge, recognition, personal satisfaction, 
feelings of power, and governmental (the support 
of one government over another) (Kleen, 2001, pp. 
3-11). If a hacker group may be studied in-depth 
for the “antecedents” to particular hacker attacks 
(e.g., what triggers the group’s motivations and 
follow-on actions), their attack behaviors may be 
anticipated and often responded to with appropri-
ate offensive and defensive measures (Jackson, 
2012, pp. 35 - 36). Jackson (2011) cautions that 
the appearance of an antecedent will not guarantee 
predictable behavior, but it may indicate increased 
probability of that behavior; after all, “a group’s 
training, guidelines, and teachings” interact with 
the antecedent (p. 43). A group’s “teaching” 
involves its ideologies, which may both animate 
and constrain group actions.
Hacker activism (or “hacktivism”) takes on a 
range of forms. Essentially, electronic direct ac-
tion is taken to create social change. On the mild 
end, it may be conceptualized as a kind of political 
activism (some would call it “cyber-agitation”) 
and expression, without laws being broken. At 
the extreme end, hacktivism may be illegal, may 
cause harm to others, and may wreak all sorts of 
damage. One author writes:
Hacktivism is a controversial term. Some argue 
it was coined strictly to describe how electronic 
direct action might work toward social change 
by combining programming skills with critical 
thinking. Others use it as practically synonymous 
with malicious, destructive acts that undermine the 
security of the Internet as a technical, economic, 
and political platform. Yet others associate it 
specifically with expressive politics, free speech, 
human rights, or information ethics (Krapp, 
2005, p. 72). 
Hacker Methodologies and 
“the State of the Art”
There are numerous mixes of methods to com-
promise information systems. All systems on the 
WWW and Internet are vulnerable to potential 
hack. Even those with an “air gap” (e.g. not con-
nected to the Net) may be vulnerable with the 
uses of mobile memory drives that may be intro-
duced into a system and infect it with malware. 
Hackers may taken on identities of individuals 
who belong in a network and access information 
and intellectual property, resources, and relation-
ships to which they have no legitimate rights 
(Kizza, 2009). Information may be intercepted. 
In a man-in-the-middle attack, information may 
be intercepted, changed, and then allowed to 
reach its natural destination—but now with false 
information or a malware payload. Hackers may 
violate individuals’ privacy by capturing private 
information and releasing it to the public. They 
may engage in industrial espionage to swipe privy 
information. A penetration (“pen”) cyber attack 
involves the unauthorized access to a protected 
system by bypassing security mechanisms (Kizza, 
2009, p. 109). Social engineering involves breach-
ing the human firewall by using psychological 
manipulations to gain access to privy information 
or systems access. This manipulation may involve 
taking on another’s identity and getting an internal 
staff member to give over information or system 
rights to an outsider. It may involve creating a 
diversion in order to gain access. A hack attack 
may involve any number of objectives and tactics.
Kizza defines a hacking topology as inclusive 
of some of the following factors: the available 
equipment, the access to the Internet, the envi-
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ronment of the network, and the offensive and 
defensive security regime around the information 
system (2009, p. 122). In Kleen’s conceptualiza-
tion, information operations depend on a variety of 
factors: the working environment, the supporting 
information infrastructure, the technologies used, 
the vulnerabilities of each aspect of the organiza-
tion, the levels of access to the technologies, the 
options for attackers (in terms of combinations 
of vulnerabilities), the other side’s measures and 
counter measures. For an attacking organization, 
their capabilities, motivations (and limiting rules 
of engagement), and planning are critical fac-
tors (Kleen, 2001, 1998). A greater skill set may 
broaden organizational vulnerabilities. To under-
stand Anonymous then, it would be important to 
look at the group’s capabilities.
A number of IT security experts have observed 
that the current state of hacker attacks have been 
of the so-called “ankle biter” or “script kiddie” 
variety—those using publicly available tools that 
may have been partially “modded” (modified) in 
order to conduct particular attacks. [In the context 
of cyber attacks, in 2011, only 4 percent were seen 
as particularly challenging to the hackers. All the 
others were relatively low-level hacks (Rashid). 
Most such attacks did not involve 0-day exploits 
(or any undiscovered software or information 
system vulnerabilities that the software maker 
or system administrators are not aware of). Such 
exploits may occur prior to developer awareness 
(thus the “zeroth day” reference) and may result 
in devastating losses or damage. The efficacies 
of such attacks have been enabled in part by 
weak security setups in various organizations, 
with systems left unpatched, with simple-level 
passwords or password re-use (on multiple sites 
and accounts), and with a work staff prone to 
compromise through social engineering (there 
are many ways into and out of a system). Many of 
the socio-technical systems in use have not been 
sufficiently hardened against attack, and many 
do not have the sufficient surveillance to even 
know when an attack has occurred or sufficient 
forensics capabilities to analyze the aftermath of 
an attack (such as a trackback mechanism) and 
to make proper attribution for certain actions. 
However inelegant the attack, the costs to the 
targeted companies may be astronomical. The 
SQL injection attack by Anonymous-affiliated 
LulzSec in 2011 was said to cost $171 million 
for Sony Pictures to address, and that sum does 
not even take into account any potential lawsuits 
from the data spill (Henderson, 2011). Therefore, 
while the virtuosity of a hack is one measure of 
power, much damage may be wrought by the 
lower-end hacks.
To pull off an effective sophisticated hacker 
intrusion attack in which sensitive information is 
located and extracted, often without the aware-
ness of the system administrators, requires two 
critical factors: expertise and deceptive stealth 
(Jackson, 2012, p. 18). There are current systems 
protection measures that involve signature or rule-
based detection (such as the indicators that show 
certain types of prior-known attacks are afoot) and 
anomaly detection (identifying unusual behav-
iors on a network as compared to that network’s 
baseline indicators), and then human expertise, 
but those approaches are too reactive and not suf-
ficiently fast; rather, it’s critical to anticipate and 
pre-empt would-be malicious hackers (Jackson, 
2012, pp. 79 - 80).
Current generations of hackers tend to be young 
males in their late teens to early 20s, and they 
deploy low-level use of cyber tools. They often 
fail to erase their own tracks. There is usually only 
one compromised system in between the hacker’s 
system and the target machines, which suggest that 
such attacks are highly trackable (Preuβ, Furnell, 
& Papadaki, 2007, p. 138). Based on known cases, 
they are apparently motivated by blackmail and 
hate. Often searches of compromised information 
systems are done manually, not with any sort of 
high-level program to scan. Their targets tend to 
be “private persons, companies, or educational 
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organizations in an equal measure” (Preuβ, Furnell, 
& Papadaki, 2007, p. 137). Many will also brag 
about their exploits. The authors observe that many 
hackers take the “path of least effort” in achieving 
the system exploitation, with downloadable attack 
scripts easily found off Google and other Web-
based search engines. Jackson, who has worked 
in cyber security for the U.S. Secret Service and 
the CIA, writes of hackers derisively: “A hacker 
simply needs to be an automaton and master only a 
very limited handful of attacks that can be repeated 
across networks, hiding behind the anonymity that 
the Internet affords” (2012, p. 119).
A creative and higher-end hacker skill set is 
thought to belong only generally to nation-states 
and possibly organized crime groups. These tal-
ent sets are rare, and while some may be willing 
to sell their talents as mercenaries, these skills 
are generally understood to be used in particu-
lar ways—notably by intelligence agencies and 
criminal enterprises. One of the tools of such 
high-end hackers involve the so-called undiscov-
ered zero-day exploit—which refers to a way to 
compromise software or software systems—and 
for which no patch exists (and no awareness of 
the exploit’s existence).
Rice (2008) suggests that gifted computer 
science graduates may discover only about 5-10 
“significant or critical software weaknesses during 
their peak years”; a rare few others have found 
30 or more vulnerabilities at the heights of their 
careers (pp. 118-119). The more known zero-day 
exploits, the broader the range of networks that 
may be entered and exploited or compromised. 
The attainment of such a high-end hacker skill 
set involves plenty of hours of immersion. It may 
also involve training—often formal—with high-
level experts in the field. Rice (2008) warns of 
“dragons” that discover zero-day exploits but do 
not flaunt their capabilities or pursue the small 
prizes. Rather, they know to hold back and wait 
to attack with great potency.
This section has set the context for hacker 
activism. Some have argued that the types of at-
tacks launched by Anonymous are not particularly 
sophisticated even if they do cause actual damage. 
Their abilities to cause harm are in large part be-
cause of a confluence of factors: the poor levels 
of security enabled in the 1970s technologies of 
the Internet; the lack of secure patching by sys-
tem administrators; the power of dark-side social 
networking, and the prevalence of tools that may 
be (mis)used. “The low price of entry, anonym-
ity, and asymmetries in vulnerability means that 
smaller actors have more capacity to exercise hard 
and soft power in cyberspace than in many more 
traditional domains of world politics,” observes 
Nye (2010, p. 1).
SELF-PROFESSED DEFINITION
Anonymous was started as an Internet meme, a 
mass noun, in 2003, and it started its activism first 
with actions “for the Lulz” (FTL) or “I did it for 
the lulz” (IDIFTL) or Lulzy banter (“Light-hearted 
and humorous banter” [Coleman, 2011, p. 7]), for 
their own irreverent mischief-making amusement. 
A neologism, “Lulz” is a plural variant of “LOL” 
or “laugh out loud.” This culture of pursuing “the 
pure joy of creating mayhem” typified some of 
the early hacks of the self-identified members of 
this group (which evolved from intercommunica-
tions in select message boards—social exchange 
spaces that use text and imagery for interactions, 
and distinct and unconnected Internet Relay Chat 
or IRC networks). One researcher found that the 
inner core of the Anonymous collective would 
go to IRC connectivity to talk in real time and 
this connection served as its core member “think 
tank” (Ohhashi, 2011, p. 5). This organization, 
in some tellings, emerged from a “hive mind” 
from a just-for-laughs organization to one with 
a political agenda to promote free speech, free 
information, and to (in some eyes) fight tyranny 
anywhere. Still, they were not known to engage in 
serious high-minded debates about these issues but 
rather in pursuing unsophisticated and “juvenile” 
approaches to issues (Mansfield-Devine, 2011).
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In the lingo of the age, the participants in 
Anonymous may be conceptualizing this organiza-
tion’s work as a kind of “collective, ongoing flash 
mob” (“Anonymous,” OhInternet). In leetspeak, 
which is based on an alternative alphabet for the 
English language used on the Internet, hackers 
strive to “pwn” (“own” or “dominate”) others by 
their superior skills and virtuosity. “leet” (written 
as “1337”) as an adjective describes prowess or 
skill in reference to an “elite” hacker. In a more 
serious comparison, their operations involve 
information operations, namely: “Offensive IO 
attempts to deny, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise con-
trol the enemy’s use of and access to information 
and information systems” (Kleen, 2001, pp. 2-4). 
Members will “dox” (“document”) anonymous 
others by tracking their Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) and revealing that to the public 
as a form of harassment or punishment.
Anonymous is a loosely coupled organiza-
tion based on some ideas may enable it to have 
resilience beyond a closely coupled organiza-
tion—which may be weakened with the arrests of 
its leaders. This organization has been described 
as “rhizomatic,” with a continuously growing 
horizontal underground stem system that puts out 
lateral shoots and “adventitious roots at intervals” 
(Coleman, 2011, pp. 2-3). Another analogy that 
has been used involves fractals, the patterned 
structures that repeat at the micro levels and at 
the macro levels. Conceptually, fractal organiza-
tions can increase exponentially and quickly, to 
outsized effects.
Gleick suggests that memes are ideas that may 
infect and colonize the human mind, and like some 
microbes, they can exist into perpetuity in the 
environment until they find other hosts to infect 
and parasitize. In other words, even if the various 
leaders of this collective movement are arrested, 
the organization itself may continue with a kind of 
resilience because of the decentralized structure. 
What connects Anonymous members seems to 
be an adherence to shared ideas and an interest 
in hacking. Their connectivity is electronic and 
occasionally physical (in real or analog spaces—
such as demonstrations or sit-ins), and targets of 
attacks and mass media statements seem some-
what crowd-sourced. Theoretically and somewhat 
practically, such spaces are open to the public, but 
that does involve some investment of time and 
effort and trust building to get closer to the inner 
core of the virtual organization. Early knowledge 
of a potential attack may increase the response 
time available to an organization or individual to 
harden attack surfaces, whereas surprise attacks 
leave very little time for maneuvering.
This light-hearted pranking approach—bor-
dering on vicious trolling harassment now and 
again—typifies one type of Anonymous attacks. 
Some targets are apparently whimsical and may 
not entail much of a payload in terms of any 
political messaging. The damage caused by their 
vigilante actions and hacks has ranged from appar-
ently minor (putting electronic graffiti on a site, 
defacing a site, denying access to sites for short 
periods) to extensive (with financial accounts 
compromised, private information released into 
the wild, private information and accounts deleted 
and sites sabotaged, and public reputations ruined). 
The organization’s willingness to engage in site 
intrusions and vandalism have elicited expressions 
of concern from U.S. government officials who 
fear attacks on the nation’s disparate electrical 
grids and suggest that national security threats 
may emanate from this group (Isikoff, 2012). 
In another case, Anonymous China dispersed 
information about how government censorship of 
the Internet may be circumvented and warned the 
Chinese government of its ultimate demise (Fer-
ran, 2012). The message they posted on hacked 
websites read, in both Chinese and English: “Dear 
Chinese government, you are not infallible, today 
websites are hacked, tomorrow it will be your vile 
regime that will fall.” If this interpretation of this 
international group as a terrorist organization is to 
be accepted, those arguing this would have to make 
the case that the group has a political agenda to 
promote their sense of “justice” and are willing to 
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use violence to achieve those aims (Cronin, 2003, 
p. 33). One researcher compares Anonymous to 
“the anarchists of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries—albeit anarchists with a vastly greater 
network and far more ability to advance their 
agenda through individual action…But even more, 
they look like the non-state insurgents the U.S. 
has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan—small groups 
of non-state actors using asymmetric means of 
warfare to destabilize and disrupt existing political 
authority” (Rosenzweig, 2011, p. 2).
If the organization may be charted in the same 
way that non-state terror groups have evolved, 
there are fears that they may achieve a level of 
tradecraft or even a breakout capability that 
may threaten critical national infrastructures. 
“Cybotage” (cyber + sabotage) includes “acts of 
disruption and destruction against information 
infrastructures by terrorists who learn the skills 
of cyber attack” (Adkins, 2001, p. 12). Cronin 
(2009) makes a cogent argument for the criticality 
of primal motives in bringing in a wider base of 
support for terror groups and a need for align-
ment to larger “historical, economic, and political 
changes” in order to be successful (p. 91). Further, 
she points out that a majority of terror groups are 
not ultimately successful in their political aims, 
with group life spans of only about eight years 
(p. 92). While proximate or process goals may be 
achieved, such as the gaining of media attention, 
the long-term successes of such weak groups 
using weak strategies (as compared to the power 
and resources of nation-states) are rare.
That said, cyber-security experts have made 
a variety of comments about the actual skills of 
Anonymous, the collective or group. A few in 
the inner core of the organization are considered 
adept hackers. Some members of the group man-
age the electronics communications infrastructure 
used by the hacker collective. Some manage the 
media wing with press releases to both mainstream 
media and social media; even more sophisticated 
group members engage the media in long-term 
communications and the offers of exclusives to 
communicate their stories and further their inter-
ests. However, the majority of populist “followers” 
or sympathizers serve as drones by letting their 
computing machines be used for DDOS attacks. 
This is a case of using “resource-exhaustion” 
to take down target servers (Mansfield-Devine, 
2011, p. 5).
Another type of activism linked to Anonymous 
relates to electronic civil disobedience, with DDOS 
attacks seen as a modern-age tactic of “trespass 
and blockade from earlier social movements” 
(Adkins, 2001, p. 8) or the “hack-in” in place of 
the traditional “sit-in.” Some political themes of 
Anonymous have related to making information 
free, fighting child pornography, promoting free-
dom movements against dictatorial governments, 
and other more localized political (broadly defined 
as relating to power and its uses in the world) aims. 
This push for free speech rights suggests a strong 
libertarian tendency.
There is also a very firm AntiSec (anti-security) 
bent to Anonymous, which hacks into various law 
enforcement-related organizations, both public 
and private. A splinter group from Anonymous, 
AntiSec stands opposed to the computer security 
industry and advocates against the full disclosure 
of security vulnerabilities and exploits to the 
public.
Other attacks seem to establish the organiza-
tion’s credentials as hackers by public feats of 
derring-do supporting by the vast downloads of 
private information or financial hacking into in-
dividuals’ accounts or listening in on law enforce-
ment calls—purely for the bravado of the actions. 
The bigger the organization take-down, the higher 
the credibility out in the online universe and the 
greater the amount of online chatter and public 
attention. In the political economy of some parts 
of the Internet, individuals and groups build social 
capital and reputation by putting themselves at risk.
Finally, this organization has embodied a tit-
for-tat strategy (returning in kind; punishing the 
other side when punished; extending cooperation 
when the other side cooperates) in an iterated 
infinite bargaining game. In the Net parlance, 
they are “b-slapping” those who would disagree 
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with them or their tactics. This means that if they 
perceive anyone that is against the ideals or actions 
of the organization, they may target that entity or 
individual with various types of hacks and other 
expressions of disagreement. Theirs is a rebuttal 
using electronic means.
Some have compared this organization to an 
“anarchic global brain” connected by the electronic 
synapses of the WWW and Internet. “Anyone can 
use the Anonymous umbrella to hack anyone at 
anytime,” says Rob Rachwald, Imperva’s direc-
tor of security (Perlroth & Markoff, 2012). The 
inclusiveness of this organization means that 
anyone who self-identifies may call themselves 
“anons” and participate in various activities linked 
to the group.
In this construct, the loose membership of the 
organization involve individuals who may never 
know who their actual “genius hacker” leaders 
are (estimated to be between half-a-dozen to a 
dozen by law enforcement sources who have been 
tracking this group) who identify targets, define 
strategies, and spark the activism (with various 
“calls to action” in social networking sites) in the 
organization and are its central core.
In a social network (sociogram) conceptualiza-
tion, which focuses on the structure of an organiza-
tion to understand power flows, the core leadership 
exercises concentrated power in directing the 
organization. While ideas can flow from anywhere 
in the network, the activating spark seems to come 
from a center. In the semi-periphery, there are 
those who handle the technologies: adding code 
to particular open-source attack tools or creat-
ing multimedia to convey the hacker collective’s 
messages. In the outer periphery are those who 
are automorphically equivalent actors—clones or 
other substitutables—who can bring the power 
of mass effect against selected targets. Within 
this construct, small clusters or cells may well 
exist with particular groups homophilously (like-
minded individuals preferring similar others) and 
closely connected with potential shared interests, 
under the much larger umbrella of Anonymous.
Other Anonymous spinoff endeavors involve 
the launching of various attacks. Still others cre-
ate the propaganda that accompanies many of the 
group’s campaigns and activities. This organiza-
tion seems to have a flat hierarchy or may even 
be conceptualized as a loose social network of 
individuals with varying skill sets but a shared 
value system or worldview (based in part on a 
hacker and “information wants to be free” ideol-
ogy). The “flash” actions have been observed 
by security personnel—for one attack (on the 
Vatican), a security firm observed that the initial 
call to actual launch of an attack took 18 days, 
with many “drones” self-radicalizing based on 
the call-to-action. Anonymous, from a majority of 
available accounts, may be characterized by a kind 
of fragmentation as a loosely coupled organiza-
tion (Orton & Weick, 1990), which may make it 
more adaptable and resilient. As the organization 
itself has observed, Anonymous is based on an 
idea, which is difficult—if not impossible—to 
squelch from the environment. In that sense, this 
anti-authority meme of free information may be 
sufficient by itself to spark some action potentials 
(the transmission of nerve signals through cells) 
in this electronic brain. In the wired ubiquitous 
memetic culture, low-density networks of indi-
viduals may be activated to act on their political 
sympathies collectively (Underwood & Weber, 
2011). Finally, while this organization asserts that 
it has no ideology, one can extrapolate one from its 
own statements; its targets and campaigns; and the 
findings of various researchers and publicly cited 
individuals in government and security agencies 
who provide yet another perspective.
Even from its early days, Anonymous has 
maintained an awareness of its public role and 
has focused on social media to release some of its 
messages and to engage with its multiple publics. 
One core goal of hacktivism is to draw attention 
to particular issues, so hacktivists “draw attention 
to particular issues by engaging in actions that are 
unusual and will attract some degree of media 
coverage” (Adkins, 2001, p. 9). The open-source 
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anarchy movement “posits an elastic relationship 
between power and ideas in which non-State actors 
directly participate, thus affecting, in various ways, 
how anarchy operates,” suggests Fidler (2008, p. 
282), in a model which may shed light on Anony-
mous’ engagements of a public dialogue (to shape 
the world). As an organization, its members are 
well aware of how media has a multiplier effect. 
They have had members help groom their image 
and clarify their main values. Further, they have 
used social media to deliver warnings and to 
conduct light debriefings post-operations.
In various physical demonstrations, they have 
taken to wearing Guy Fawkes masks with the 
smirky grin. Fawkes (Apr. 13, 1570 – Jan. 13, 
1606) was a Brit who fought the Spanish in the 
Low Countries and is known for having taken 
part in the planning for the failed Gunpowder 
Plot of 1605, to restore the Catholic monarch to 
the throne. He was in charge of the gunpowder 
stockpiled beneath the House of Lords but was 
discovered. Shortly before he was to be hanged, 
he jumped off the scaffold and avoided being 
hung and quartered. In V for Vendetta (2006), 
the anti-hero “V” wore a Guy Fawkes mask. This 
knife-throwing anti-hero “V” was fighting what 
he saw as a totalitarian and fascist government. 
His approach to the world: “People should not be 
afraid of their governments. Governments should 
be afraid of their people” (which is derived from 
John Basil Barnhill, who said, “Where the people 
fear the government you have tyranny. Where the 
government fears the people you have liberty”). 
This popular film serves as an allegory of oppres-
sive or intrusive government, which Anonymous 
uses as a rallying point and potentially a work of 
inspiration. A core point of the film is the use of 
fear to maintain power, and fear is a weapon by 
both sides—the government and the people. Guy 
Fawkes Day (Nov. 5) has been a day in which 
big targets are announced by “Anons,” such as 
the promise to take down Facebook™ (Tennant, 
2011).
GROUP ACTIONS: “THE 
PROPAGANDA OF THE DEED”
In the International Relations (IR) literature, in 
regards to politically motivated non-state actors, 
they communicate to the broader public using 
the so-called “propaganda of the deed.” They use 
such often costly signaling to not only demonstrate 
their power but also communicate their sense of 
resolve. (A “costly signal” is one, which involves 
both risk and investment to an organization to 
prove its capabilities but also its commitment to 
a certain cause. A cost-free signal, by contrast, 
would be “cheap talk.” These would include poses 
and statements but little in the way of action or 
follow-through.) Such actions may also enhance 
the commitment of members to the group. Based 
on this conceptualization, Anonymous has some 
unique signature “tells” (a change in behavior 
or appearance that reveals something about the 
individual; a term used in poker and gambling; 
what the other side does or doesn’t do that reveals 
something hidden) that indicate particular actions 
as their own.
The actions of political groups may be under-
stood as both striving to advance the objectives of 
the group and of providing a “shout out” to their 
respective constituencies—to raise their credibility 
and to recruit even more followers. All actions 
are also “polysemic” or many-meaninged; they 
may be interpreted in different ways depending 
on perspective.
The Company We Keep
Something may be said about an organization by 
the other entities with whom it socializes and/
or aligns for political actions. In Figure 3, “In 
the Anonymous Hacker Socio-Political Sphere 
(Buckyball) of Influence,” this depiction conceptu-
alizes a loose-knit group of possible stakeholders 
that may be conceptualized as satellites of Anony-
mous. Individuals decide how much they want to 
self-select into the loose orbit of Anonymous and 
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how much they may want to participate in one 
campaign or another. It is questionable how close 
any one member can get to the core membership, 
which is likely regularly probed by law enforce-
ment and others. There are broad constituencies 
though who exist on the periphery of the group. (A 
“buckyball” or “spherical fullerene” is a molecule 
composed of carbon and appears as a hollow sphere 
or “empty cage” of 60 or more carbon atoms. It 
is used here not because of anything else than its 
general sense of a loose social network illustration. 
This illustration does not show the sense of an at-
traction to the organization, something that might 
be better indicated by some gravitational mass.)
A more nuanced and informative illustration 
would show fatter and thinner nodes and clearer 
lines of communication. As it is, this only provides 
a broad sense of the Anonymous sphere of mu-
tual influence. This also captures the “all channel” 
reality of the Internet in which any code can 
theoretically connect with any other for possibly 
unusual and unpredictable coalitions of individu-
als with temporally shared interests. Anonymous 
has spun off various organizations, such as Lulz-
Sec (which hacks for the “laughs” or the “fun” of 
causing havoc and has been active on and off, 
with a self-professed hiatus) and AntiSec (which 
disrupts the security structures used on the Inter-
net by hacking various private companies and 
government entities) hacktivist organizations. It 
is reportedly close to a hacker group known as 
Script Kiddies, Red Hack, and other groups—
many linked to particular countries or regions. It 
has aligned beside Wikileaks organizations/move-
ments, and also has stood behind individuals they 
see as typifying certain shared values like Julian 
Assange (founder of Wikileaks), Bradley Manning 
(the individual accused of leaking secret U.S. 
documents to Wikileaks), and others. Such orga-
nizations share a temporary mutualism of interests, 
which result in temporal alliances.
Part of this organizational influence involves 
the “soft” power of messaging to a number of 
individuals from different audiences. Figure 4, 
“A Conceptualization of Audience Members for 
Anonymous Acts/Attacks/Messages,” offers a 
conceptualization of the various audience mem-
bers who are apparently affected by Anonymous 
actions.
The actions taken by this group may be un-
derstood to be conveying messages to a number 
of potential audience members. The targeted or-
Figure 3. In the Anonymous hacker socio-political 
sphere (buckyball) of influence
Figure 4. A conceptualization of audience mem-
bers for Anonymous acts/attacks/messages
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ganization that is the subject of an attack is the 
recipient of a direct message about the organiza-
tion’s displeasure with particular ideas, statements, 
or actions. Within the core group, there are others 
receiving direct messages include the core con-
stituencies: the hacktivists and other hacker groups. 
The propaganda of the deed conveys a particular 
power about the group’s potency and commitment 
to political ideals and actions. In the next layer 
out of the concentric circle would be the mass 
media, the so-called “undecideds” in the public 
who may choose to side with Anonymous’s ideals 
and actions. Virtually all the known successful 
Anonymous “operations” were lauded with press 
releases, official statements, and information 
shared through social networking sites. In many 
cases, prior to attacks, the organization released 
information about impending attacks—both to 
verify their hand in the attack and to garner pub-
licity to appeal to their various audiences. The 
organization invests a fair amount into their out-
reach and recruitment efforts, based on the videos 
they have released for public consumption through 
videosharing spaces like YouTube™ and micro-
blogging sites like Twitter™. Their messages 
emphasize their legitimacy and moral rightness; 
some of their campaigns focused on a “Robin 
Hood” approach in terms of giving away hacked 
funds to charities (for example). In the third pe-
riphery would be “The Man,” those elements of 
government and corporate power against whom 
Anonymous is fighting—for free information, 
freedom of citizens, and other issues. In the far 
external ring would be the peripheral audience 
members who are aware and may not even be the 
intended audience.
Beyond the different messages to the different 
audience members, one act may have multi-layered 
meanings. An ideological meaning may affirm the 
members’ creed. It may convey a message about 
the organizational identity and brand—with the 
hack defining the hacker, the hacktivism defining 
the hacktivist. To do is an act of being. An opera-
tion may have political implications in terms of 
both soft (messaging and persuasive) and hard 
(actual) power. As the organization becomes more 
sophisticated and innovates new attacks, there may 
be technological messaging (think the allegedly 
state-sponsored software saboteur Stuxnet, Duqu 
Worm, and the espionage-based Flamer/Flame/
sKyWIper, but at a much simpler level).
The Direct Targets of Anonymous 
Cyber Operations: Global and Local
The targets of Anonymous “operations” inform 
observers about what this pluralist and anomic 
interest group sees as its objectives. How a group 
formulates and acts on its “enemies list” may be 
used to understand a group’s self-definition and 
ideology (Reagan, 2012). An analysis of docu-
mented targets shows a broad range of targets—
from those who seem to be targets of whimsy 
(lulz-y targets) and those which are powerful and 
high-profile (various governments, corporations, 
and individuals). Some press accounts suggest 
that Anonymous calls its own work “guerrilla 
cyberwar” (Isikoff, 2011). Some targets are criti-
cal to certain local interests, and others are more 
obviously global in focus. As an organization, 
Anonymous stances have to go beyond mere sym-
bolic help and moral support. They need to signal 
their resolve by having actual effect to bolster their 
threats and standing. The organization’s issuing of 
prior warnings to some entities and organizations 
shows this attempt at projecting power even by the 
power of reputation alone. The dubbing of various 
larger operations with specific names makes their 
endeavors more memorable. The fallout effects 
of their operations have ranged also from annoy-
ances to actual damage to reputations, corporate 
earnings, and privacy. If there is a signature in an 
analysis of the organization’s targets, it is that the 
movement does not back off a challenge and will 
pursue high-profile medium-impact events—but 
with high message value.
Early operations—like the Habbo raids (social 
networking site), the Hal Turner raid (a “white-
supremacist” radio host), and the Chris Forcand 
arrest (an “alleged Internet predator”)—involved 
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a range of almost idiosyncratic political issues. 
“Project Chanology” (2008) against the Church 
of Scientology’s “Internet censorship” apparently 
followed Wikileaks’ lead; this attack involved 
DDOS attacks (using the now-defunct Gigaloader.
com tool for server load testing), prank calls, 
and so-called black faxes (to run down the toner 
of the receiving organization if they printed out 
faxes on paper). In the same year, there was an 
attack on the Epilepsy Foundation with flashing 
computer animations to trigger photosensitive and 
pattern-sensitive epilepsy—an operation which 
some Anonymous members disavowed as planted 
information by an adversary. Another attack was 
launched the same year against an online hip hop 
site, which involved defacement of the site and 
a DDOS attack.
Olson (2012) suggests that this organization 
came of age in 2008 with its first full-blown at-
tack on the Church of Scientology but that its 
membership split in 2009 between those pursu-
ing “lulz” and those pursuing political activism, 
which resulted in plenty of “e-drama” on the 
various message boards and communications 
channels (p. 93).
In 2009, a teenager who advocated “no cussing” 
came under attack with his personal information 
released to the public. Anonymous members 
rallied some 22,000 supporters to uphold the 
Iranian Green Movement (a protest movement) 
that aligned with The Pirate Bay (a site for illegal 
sharing of media contents) and Iranian hackers. 
These hacktivists also set up an information 
exchange between the world and Iran. In “Op-
eration Didgeridle,” the German and Australian 
governments were attacked for plans for ISP-level 
censorship of the Internet; Anonymous aimed to 
“protect civil rights” (Anonymous, 2012). In early 
2010, Anonymous launched Operation Titstorm, 
a DDOS attack against the Australian government 
for its consideration of Internet filtering legisla-
tion. In Operation Payback (2010), this organiza-
tion worked to deface sites and launch denial of 
service attacks against anti-piracy law firms and 
financial companies that closed accounts used 
for fund-raising by Wikileaks (including PayPal, 
MasterCard, and Visa. This organization deployed 
botnets of “zombie computers” that were infected 
by malware that enabled their takeover and use to 
attack these companies, resulting in a powerful 
capability at shutting down commercial-grade 
systems; Panda Security found that 90 percent of 
the DDOS-ing firepower for the attack on PayPal 
came from zombie computers, not direct Anony-
mous volunteers—even though the public relations 
wing of the organization preferred to credit their 
followers (Olson, 2012, pp. 116 – 119). While 
some of the organizers were well aware that the 
power to DDOS systems came not from hordes of 
activists but more from the botnets, they played 
up the idea of many engaged hacktivists to the 
press (Olson, 2012, p. 122).
Anonymous used the slogan “You call it pi-
racy. We call it freedom” to explain their stance. 
“Operation Bradical” advocated for better treat-
ment of Bradley Manning, the private first-class 
alleged to have released numerous confidential 
U.S. government documents to Wikileaks. Opera-
tion Leakspin (2010) was launched to support an 
activist effort to vet the Wikileaks cables in order 
to identify any previously overlooked ones. It was 
at this time that some activists in Anonymous cre-
ated their own IRC channel for organizing battles 
against copyright:
Scattered between Britain, mainland Europe, and 
the United States, these mostly young men pooled 
their access to ten computer servers around the 
world. Some had rented the servers, some owned 
them, but with them, they could make a chat net-
work that Anonymous could finally call home. No 
more herding hundreds of people between differ-
ent places before getting kicked off. That month 
they established what they called AnonOps, a 
new IRC network with dozens of chat rooms just 
for Anons, some public and some private (Olson, 
2012, p. 105). 
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For a five-day period in 2010, the website 
of Kiss frontman Gene Simmons was targeted 
by an Anonymous hacker (who used the handle 
“spydr101”), who was arrested in 2011 by the FBI 
in late 2011. What raised the ire of the hacker? 
Apparently, the performer lamented the fact that 
the music industry could not sue “every fresh-
faced, freckle-faced college kid who downloaded 
material” (Schwartz, 2011).
In 2011, Anonymous hacktivists broke into 
the Syrian Ministry of Presidential Affairs’ email 
server as a protest against President Bashar al-
Assad, who had been fighting peaceful protestors 
with deadly force. In February 2011, there were 
some public statements between Anonymous and 
the Westboro Baptist Church (in Kansas) but no 
final word on if Anonymous members actually 
launched an operation or whether the church was 
alleging an attack for its own publicity purposes 
(It turns out that both sides used the event for 
self-promotion, according to We are Anonymous).
In “Operation Pharisee,” (in August 2011), 
the organization launched an attack that was 
observed from start-to-finish by security profes-
sionals—who documented the “reconnaissance 
and warfare tactics used by the shadowy hacking 
collective” (Perlroth & Markoff, 2012, p. 1). The 
target here was the Vatican, and the observing 
company was Imperva—which had been aware of 
the rally against the Vatican through YouTube™, 
Twitter™, and Facebook™. It took Anonymous 
some 18 days to raise the sufficient number of 
people for the attack, which ultimately did not 
succeed because of the security measures taken. 
(In a sense, the Vatican sites were used as a virtual 
“honeypot” or “honey net” or trap to elicit infor-
mation about Anonymous’ tactics). Anonymous 
expressed its displeasure at the conservative 
organization Americans for Prosperity for sup-
porting Wisconsin governor Scott Brown (R) in 
his efforts to take away union bargaining rights. In 
a continuing of the organization’s support for the 
Iranian Green Movement, Anonymous infiltrated a 
mail server for the government and copied 10,000 
internal emails and images. This hacker collective 
launched Operation UnManifest in July 2011 by 
asking its members to modify copies of the mani-
festo by Norwegian mass shooter Anders Breivik 
to disrupt the distribution of his ideology (Mans-
field-Devine, 2011, p. 5). In mid-2011, in Tango 
Down, these hacktivists targeted both the CIA and 
Alabama state to protest immigration legislation 
that the group saw as “racist.” The group hacked 
into government sites, launched DDOS attacks, 
and harvested over 45,000 Alabamans’ personal 
information. To promote their fight against firms 
supporting anti-piracy endeavors, this hacker col-
lective launched DDOS attacks against a Spanish 
agency, a French government agency, Hustler, and 
the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) in Oct. – Nov. 2011. Then in late 2011, 
Stratfor Global Intelligence Service was attacked 
with private client information released to the 
public (often in “data dumps” to Pastebin (a Web 
application that enables the uploading of text for 
sharing), Torrent (peer-to-peer file sharing), Pirate 
Bay (file sharing site), and other sites—and often 
encouraging others to make sure of the informa-
tion by illegally accessing others’ accounts. (The 
damage from that attack was estimated to be $2 
million [Olson, 2012, p. 396].) They have created 
mirror sites to ensure that loads of swiped code 
have been downloadable by any who might be 
interested. Private companies have turned to law 
enforcement to address such hacks, and some 
have even taken part in law enforcement stings to 
increase cyber security. Many private companies 
and publicly traded corporations have put in loss 
tolerance and stop-loss policies and measures to 
limit the damage that may be done by hacks. It 
is highly likely that downloads from the various 
sites that stolen code has been placed is monitored 
closely by law enforcement. The Irish political 
party Fine Gael was criticized and its site was 
hacked by Anonymous for their stance regarding 
censorship.
In 2011, some websites of the Zimbabwe gov-
ernment were targeted because of censorship of 
the Wikileaks documents. The Arab Spring move-
ments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Jordan, 
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and Morocco were supported by Anonymous with 
various operations. (Olson [2012] writes that one 
of Anonymous’s top hackers, Sabu [Hector Xavier 
Monsegur] had actually remoted in to a Tunisian 
citizen’s account—with his permission—in order 
to launch an attack against that country’s prime 
minister’s site. The relative sophistication of this 
cyber attack was higher than the normal tactics 
which relied on simple downloads and commands).
A skirmish with a security firm occurred in 
February 2011. Aaron Barr, the CEO of HBGary 
Federal, broke news that his firm had infiltrated 
Anonymous. According to press reports, he cor-
related timestamps; a user in IRC would post 
something, and then a Twitter post on the same 
topic might appear a second later. He also posed 
as an Anonymous member in the various com-
munications spaces that the organization was 
known to haunt. He tracked communicators with 
various unique identifiers. He matched handles 
to real names. Some suggested that his approach 
erroneously implicated individuals who were in-
nocent bystanders. Forbes London-bureau chief 
Parmy Olson (2012), in her investigation into 
Anonymous, highlighted some of the holes in 
his investigations. Anonymous’s response was 
apparently to hack the company’s email, dump a 
trove of 68,000 emails from their system, erase 
files, and disrupt their telephone system. This 
coordinated attack involved a combination of 
semi-sophisticated hacks (in a hybrid attack), 
including spear (targeted) phishing. In an act of 
vicarious retribution, the Anonymous organiza-
tion released privy information found on HBGary 
Federal servers, and select email messages that 
showed how the security company functioned were 
revealed. It also launched private attacks on Barr 
himself by taking over his Twitter feed and posting 
his alleged Social Security number. Press reports 
suggest that only 5 hackers were needed to “take 
down” HBGary Federal. Barr later resigned from 
this company (Anderson, 2011). This attack was 
seen by many as the politics of personal destruc-
tion and a potential miscalculation by the group.
Another interpretation of the prior attack may 
be that it was an expression of their protective-
ness of their own. An April 2012 DOS attack on 
the British Home Office expressed concerns that 
European hackers were being extradited to face 
justice in the U.S. for their activities on behalf of 
Anonymous (“UK government website disrupted 
by hacker attack,” Apr. 8, 2012).
In another case, the home of a cybercrime 
expert was surrounded by a Special Weapons and 
Tactics (SWAT) unit based on an elaborate prank 
by Anonymous members who were harassing him 
for a statement he’d made about cyberbullying 
(Newcomb, 2011).
The group made a stand against Indian cor-
ruption in 2011. In mid-2011, it launched attacks 
against 91 websites of the Malaysian government 
because of the country’s blocking websites like 
Wikileaks and The Pirate Bay, which Anonymous 
saw as censorship.
In a local attack, in Operation Orlando (June 
2011), the organization launched operations 
against various government websites in Orlando, 
Florida, in response to the arrests of members 
of Food Not Bombs for feeding the homeless in 
a local park against city ordinances. The group 
called for boycotts of Orlando. Operation Intifada 
(June 2011) resulted in attacks against a website 
of the Knesset of Israel based on assertions that 
Israeli intelligence had released the Stuxnet virus 
against the Iranian nuclear program.
Anonymous operations move into real or 
physical space as well. In August 2011, the group 
called for mass physical protects in response to 
the Bay Area Rapid Transit’s plan to shut down 
cell phone service to discourage protestors from 
assembling non-violently to a police shooting of 
a rider. Members affiliated with Anonymous ap-
parent “sent out a mass email/fax bomb to BART 
personnel” as well (Anonymous, 2012).
In Operation DarkNet (October 2011), this 
organization made a statement against child 
pornography by taking down 40 child porn sites 
and publishing the names of 1,500 people who 
frequented the sites. They invited the FBI and In-
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terpol to follow up on that information. The same 
month, this group released a video asserting that 
the Los Zetas cartel had kidnapped one of their 
group members and threatened to publish personal 
information about the cartel members and their 
collaborators in mainstream society unless this 
individual was let go.
The first report of a possible extortion plot 
linked to the Anonymous name involved an at-
tack on Symantec pcAnywhere (Ribeiro, 2012). 
One researcher speculates that this organization 
would not misuse credit card data or commit 
felonies (Ohhashi, 2011, p. 9). An email account 
of a member of Scotland Yard was accessed in 
early 2012, and in Opinfiltration, members of 
Anonymous recorded a call between the FBI and 
Scotland Yard about their group and posted it for 
public consumption. When a U.S. Marine plead 
guilty of killing two dozen unarmed Iraqi women 
and children in 2005 and was given a demotion 
instead of prison time, Anonymous posted 3 gi-
gabytes of the email correspondence by attorneys 
in the case in early 2012. The controversial Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Protect IP Act 
(PIPA) were so unpopular with Anonymous mem-
bers that a number of government and corporate 
targets were hit with DDOS attacks. This fight 
against SOPA and PIPA involved “the first direct 
and public activist malware from Anonymous.” 
Here, individuals clicking on a link to get more 
information actually ended up triggering the LOIC 
that helped in the attack (Norton, 2012). In early 
2012, Operation Blitzkrieg involved the target-
ing of neo-Nazi organizations, and there were 
links claimed between such organizations and an 
American presidential candidate. Mid-year, they 
participated in a live protest in Montreal against 
Bill 78, which restricted the freedom of associa-
tion after weeks of student protests. On the cyber 
front, the organization took down the websites 
of the Liberal Party of Quebec, the Ministry of 
Public Security of Quebec, and a government site 
addressing police ethics. This organization has 
supported various Occupy protest movements 
against some of the U.S. government’s economic 
policies, and it protested the International Mon-
etary Fund’s role in the Greek bailout. An Indian 
branch of the Anonymous hacker collective took 
on an East Indian company for its role in Internet 
“censorship.” Other operations have been credited 
to this organization, but the main themes of these 
actions have been captured in the above examples.
From this overview of the organization’s 
operations, it is clear that the leadership is politi-
cally aware and engaged. They use a variety of 
strategies to plan and launch their attacks. They 
have taken an “information wants to be free” (or 
“pro-piracy” stance—said another way) approach 
and has defined the access to information as a 
basic human right. Their hacks of governments 
have involved those that fall along a political 
range from democratic to authoritarians. The 
anarchic stance means that any government that 
takes an information-control or proprietary stance 
may become a target. The protection of workers’ 
rights and pro-independence demonstrators seems 
to suggest a left-leaning agenda. However, the 
attacks on IP could suggest more of a Far Left 
agenda, with more of a focus on open-source 
than on property rights. From their selection of 
targets against whom they’ve acted, the ideol-
ogy of Anonymous does not fit easily into any 
particular pre-set mode but seems to be evolving 
from a smorgasbord of ideas. Often, their actions 
seem reactive to what has occurred in the world 
already and is a move to change the direction of 
certain policies or practices. One reporter has 
observed that Anonymous “is fueled by a raft of 
causes” (Sengupta, 2012).
By contrast, Brey (2007e) argues the unsustain-
ability of hacker ethics because absolutely free 
information means that intellectual property would 
not exist—and creators of works would not have 
an ability to benefit from their own labors; further, 
their property rights would be violated. Hacking 
then goes against the ethics if the information 
technology field. The Anonymous collective de-
scribes themselves as fighters against censorship. 
75
Action Potentials
Their actions suggest a kind of anarchism in how 
they comfortably take on various governments 
around the world. Their appeals to mass media and 
social media demonstrate a savvy about framing 
their actions in a political theatre and even a kind 
of cyber performance art. They are clearly able 
to conduct multiple attacks simultaneously or at 
least in close time proximity to each other. Host 
of Surprisingly Free (Mercatus Center at George 
Mason University), Brito has made the note that 
the organization has become more “self-aware” 
as they have engaged in more hacktivism (Brito, 
2012).
Just because the organization has participated 
in some high-profile operations does not mean 
that it does not also potentially conduct operations 
quietly and without the usual attendant publicity. 
Some researchers have identified attempted take-
downs that did not fully work, which the organi-
zation did not claim (Perlroth & Markoff, 2012).
Finally, what an organization says about itself 
for public consumption is clearly informed by 
their self-conceptualization and also by their or-
ganizational objectives. However, self-identity is 
seldom comprehensive nor particularly insightful. 
When objective information about an individual 
is not available, that may well lead to imperfect 
self-knowledge, and that knowledge by be affected 
also by “minor manipulations of salience such as 
cues, reminders and transparent veils of personal 
responsibility” (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011, p. 807). 
How they are seen by others may provide more 
critical layers of insight, particularly for an orga-
nization as elusive and private as Anonymous.
THE INSIGHTS OF OTHERS
For a group that is security conscious and tries 
to live by its name, Anonymous has been inter-
preted by law enforcement, researchers, thinkers, 
and other hacktivist groups. In public spaces, 
there are plenty of opinions about this group and 
how it functions. Tennant (2011) has called this 
group of “Anons” “a border-less, leader-less, 
ever expanding army of techno-vigilantes, mis-
anthropic pranksters, human-rights crusaders, 
and free-speech absolutists” (p. 1). This section 
then addresses some of the insights of researchers 
who have studied this group and released their 
findings publicly.
The name Anonymous is a misnomer (and 
possibly wishful thinking) in several ways. It 
suggests that the organization is constructed of 
the proverbial Everyperson but also no one. The 
generic term is used as an attribution. This implies 
that individuals may participate in Anonymous 
activities and stay unknown—which is a near 
impossibility on the Internet, even with wide-
spread uses of online aliases, anonymization 
techniques and tools, and privacy protections. 
It’s also disingenuous to suggest that this group 
is leaderless. Published reports have suggested 
that there is a small leadership core that serves 
as the brainchild of this organization, and while 
others may make claims to membership, they may 
well be on the periphery or not connected to the 
organization beyond a self-identification. (The 
organization itself will demonstrate some aspects 
of the “black-sheep effect” in response to in-group 
members that have been seen to be disloyal—such 
as members who have been later identified to 
be working with law enforcement or those who 
opt-in as spokespeople for the group. In extreme 
cases, such members are expelled, and their ac-
counts are deleted out of virtual communities by 
system administrators. The public and electronic 
lambasting of these individuals may play a role 
in keeping members in line).
There have been claims of Anonymous at-
tacks to come that have not materialized within 
the operational window, and these have not been 
claimed by the organization. Some attacks claimed 
by people who claim membership in Anonymous 
have been directly outright disavowed. For ex-
ample, in July 2010, when the Oregon Tea Party 
used Anonymous slogans for its event, the Party’s 
site was flamed and defaced (Anonymous, 2012). 
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Other actions taken by self-affiliating members 
have resulted in public chidings through social 
media. One example involves the debate over 
splinter groups like Lulzsec posting private data 
like credit card and Social Security numbers on 
Web users and launching DDOS attacks against 
media organizations that did not provide cover-
age that the group could agree with. The group 
does not have a selected spokesperson but only 
a few who self-identify as pseudo-insiders who 
self-appoint to speak for the group in public—at 
great cost of public ridicule. The lack of access 
to the leadership has meant that some have gone 
to public channels to release “open letters to 
Anonymous” in order to try to get a response, 
with varying levels of success.
The Apparent Leadership
Cyber security researchers agree that there appears 
to be a core leadership for the group, even if their 
identities are not widely known outside a small 
circle. These are the individuals “running key 
Twitter accounts, producing YouTube™ videos 
and controlling important channels (some closed 
to the general public) on IRC servers”(Mansfield-
Devine, 2011, p. 5). Others have identified the 
group’s structure as a half-dozen “geniuses” 
surrounding by a lot of others willing to be used 
by the leaders of the group (Perlroth & Markoff, 
2012) as drones, who turn their computers over to 
be used in attacks. Another suggests that “skilled 
programmers, security researchers, and system ad-
ministrators” support this organization (Coleman, 
2011, p. 2). A recent book, We are Anonymous, 
introduces some of the real-world individu-
als behind their handles Sabu, Topiary, Kayla, 
AVunit, Tflow, and others based on interviews 
and direct communications between the author 
and the various hackers. The leaders are depicted 
as more healthily cautious: going through Virtual 
Private Networks to mask their unique Internet 
Protocols; disconnecting their handles from any 
real-world identifiers on the Internet; using virtual 
machines to hack from; encrypting sensitive files 
and passwords; vetting all individuals angling for a 
position of trust, and taking tactical conversations 
private on closed IRC chat areas.
Funding Steams
As an organization, except for a few reports of self-
proclaimed members trying to extort money from 
companies (or else their stolen information will 
be published on a website), Anonymous does not 
seem to have solicited funds. They may well free 
ride the structure of the Internet and certain free-
ware tools. Operations are apparently self-funded 
by the participants. Moneys that have been taken 
from compromised accounts seem to have gone to 
charities but even those would be reverted back to 
the original owners. Various hackers aligned with 
Anonymous have been accused of eliciting funds, 
nude images, passwords, and other concessions 
from their various victims—as part of pranking 
and apparently even extortion. Its spin-off Lulz-
Sec did solicit digital currency through Bitcoin 
and apparently raised some $7,500, which was 
distributed—$1,000 each—to its leadership after 
electronic laundering through moving the digital 
money through a series of accounts (Olson, 2012, 
pp. 264, 304 – 306).
The Technology Tools of Anonymous
One of the weaknesses of Anonymous is that 
they often have to tip their hand in public through 
communications sites to rally support, share 
information, recruit and mobilize, and share 
propaganda before they can launch a wide-scale 
or distributed attack. If the organization engages 
in too much security, they lose out on group or-
ganization efficiencies, particularly for a global 
organization firmly reliant on public information 
and communication technology. This means that 
any in law enforcement and security firms can 
have fair warning and can help various targeted 
entities and individuals prepare for the potential 
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attack. They can infiltrate the organization with 
undercover agents (which partially explains the 
continual messages of paranoia expressed on the 
shared communications spaces). Further, targeted 
organizations may set up various “honeypots” or 
“honey nets” to record all aspects of an attack and 
learn more about the organization and its methods. 
Compared to the structured attacks “by transna-
tional and national groups,” those of hacktivists 
tend to be unstructured or semi-structured. Most 
use freeware or off-hacker-site tools. Most attacks 
are not sustained or sustainable currently by the 
organization but may be standalone or sequential 
but discrete attacks. Hackers self-reveal with every 
operation (Mansfield-Devine, 2011, p. 5), so their 
concerns should generally be both offensive and 
defensive. Anonymous’ high response rates to 
provocations show a deeper lack of sophistication.
In some cases where they may act with stealth 
and secrecy, this involves hacks that are apparently 
only executed by some elite members of the group 
with specialized hacking skills. If successful, such 
events are then sometimes publicized by the col-
lective. Researchers who have studied this group 
suggest that their language capabilities seem to 
be English, Spanish, and French—but with the 
group’s use of voice synthesizers and translators, 
they could actually broaden their reach. Various 
media accounts have put the numbers of potential 
actors in an Anonymous operation at a wide range 
of participants from hundreds to about 22,000 
(“Timeline of events involving Anonymous,” Mar. 
2012). A core approach to understanding a hacker 
group involves mapping its modus operandi.
For Anonymous, various DDOS (distributed 
denial of service) and DOS (denial of service) 
attacks have used a tool by Praetox Technologies 
called Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC), which was 
designed for use to “load-test” or “stress-test” a 
site. This tool may be used as a Windows execut-
able file that is downloaded and run from a PC, or 
a Javascript-based version that may be integrated 
into a Web page and used by site visitors. Since 
Operation Payback in 2010, an in-browser Javas-
cript version of LOIC has been in use for various 
Anonymous operations.
The version used by Anonymous, according 
to one security researcher, has been retrofitted 
with a “crude command and control capability” 
to enable the launching of a broad-based attack 
against particular sites selected by the group’s 
leaders/the group.
No skill is required to use LOIC. The Javascript 
version just needs the user to enter a target address 
and click the ‘fire’ button, although there are some 
optional settings. The Windows executable can 
be equally simple to use, and also offers a ‘hive 
mind’ option in which it will attempt to discover 
the current target from an IRC channel (with the 
IRC server and channel specified by the user). 
This makes it even easier for the user, who simply 
has to start the program running. Knowledgeable 
users can select a variety of options, such as type of 
packets sent (TCP, UDP, or HTTP), port numbers, 
and so on (Mansfield-Devine, 2011).
The use of this tool as a hacking one is tanta-
mount to sending “a menace letter with a return 
address” (Pras, et al., 2010, p. 8) because the tool 
captures the Internet Protocol (IP) of the user. The 
organization’s power lies partially with its “surge” 
capacity in terms of activating individuals to take 
part (Olson, 2012, p. 49).
Law Enforcement and Anonymous
Arrayed against the hackers are those in law 
enforcement who train in both offensive and de-
fensive cyber measures and who work to protect 
computer forensic evidence in order to ensure 
that the information is sufficiently pristine to be 
used in a court of law. One author suggests that 
the government may acquire a court’s permission 
to put key loggers on a suspect’s computer system 
to read every keystroke in order to learn more 
about potential criminal enterprises and to bring 
charges (Glenny, 2011). He also cites the case of 
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DarkMarket where American law enforcement 
ended up co-hosting a site which was used by 
“carders” to compromise the financial data of many 
around the world, so U.S. law enforcement could 
work with their colleagues around the world to 
capture those abusing the global financial system. 
One “public enemy #1” against hackers is John 
Vranesevich, whose computers track and “often 
archive, hacker chatter on some 142,000 different 
Web sites and I.R.C. channels. In other words, he 
has much of the hacking world wired for sound” 
(Burrough, 2000, p. 3).
Law enforcement agencies in a number of 
countries have arrested those involved in illegal 
hacking. Maintaining pseudonymity (anonymity 
over time) or even a deceptive self-presentation 
is a very difficult proposition given today’s 
“traceback” technologies and criminal forensics 
techniques that are capable of revealing Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) on a computer and 
network. There are unique identifiers for virtually 
all computing machines and places on a network. 
All accounts may be traced back to individuals. 
HTML files may be pathed to a local drive on 
which the file was created (this goes for other 
authored files), which can lead to real names, for 
example. Such unique identifiers lead to real-
world identities. In cases where crimes have been 
committed, law enforcement has been effective 
in many countries in arresting the individuals, 
and various courts have had success prosecuting 
cases of hacktivism as cyber crimes and the work 
of malicious actors. The counter-narrative of law 
enforcement is that people are accountable for 
what they do online even if they may feel ano-
nymized or invisible, and the inter-jurisdictional 
reality of Internet crimes may provide a challenge 
to them—but will not stop crime fighters from 
tracking down those involved in cyber crimes 
(even if there are hacktivist or political or ideo-
logical motives). There is no impunity for crimes 
actualized through computer technologies, even 
if there may be perceived less risk by the perpe-
trators. Their law enforcement actions suggest 
that hacking not only does not pay but does not 
really institutionalize lasting changes. There are 
other ways to make statements and have a voice 
in civic discourse. Hacking itself is illegal. The 
members who would risk law-breaking and who 
under-estimate the capabilities of law enforcement 
do so to their own detriment. Foremost, law en-
forcement’s counter-narrative unmasks members 
and charges them with crimes—and uses many of 
the same tools to reach the public to convey this 
message as Anonymous uses to reach theirs. At 
an international level, some are working to turn 
“pirates of the ISPs” into “international pariahs” 
through political and policy strategies (Shacht-
man, 2011).
In the past few years, there have been arrests for 
attacks against private corporations and govern-
ment offices—in The Netherlands, the U.S., Brit-
ain, Australia, Spain, Turkey, and other countries.
In terms of a future ambition, Anonymous has 
expressed interest in pulling off “Operation Global 
Blackout,” which they described in a video and 
released on Facebook™. They expressed an inter-
est in shutting down Facebook’s 60,000 servers. 
In another attack under the same label, the group 
suggested that it would strive to bring down the 
Internet by attacking the root name servers (which 
connect URLs to particular numbers to make 
the various resources on the WWW and Internet 
locatable. These endeavors would be quite a bit 
more complex than the current levels of known 
Anonymous attacks.
Anonymous is like a meta-memetic, multi-user 
identity. No person is anonymous, and yet people 
act through Anonymous and refer to one another 
as anonymous or ‘anon.’ Anonymous has a written 
history spread across various wikis all over the 
Web.8 Anonymous has create crushing volumes of 
visual media from photo-shopped images ranging 
from cats (lolcats), to political threats, to porn 
created to satisfy one of their central tenets: Rules 
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of the Internet: Rule 34: If it exists, there is porn 
of it. No Exceptions (Ramsdell, 2011, p. 8). 
In terms of counter measures, law enforce-
ment has a number of ways to identify members 
of the organization. They may map out the actual 
social networks behind hacktivist groups. They 
may monitor sites where swiped information has 
been placed for download, and they may use the 
legal system to force private corporations to turn 
over information about users. Law enforcement 
has been known to use shell accounts to emulate 
members of a company or organization in order 
to elicit information about such groups and their 
demands.
Various governments have been putting into 
place legislation to increase law enforcement 
powers to pursue those who launch cyber attacks. 
To protect its own freedom of movement and in 
line with their stated goals, this organization has 
taken on the controversial Stop Online Piracy 
Act (SOPA) and Protect IP Act (PIPA), both of 
which went down in defeat. Then, in early 2012, 
the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection 
Act (CISPA) passed the Senate. The group put 
out a video calling U.S. citizens to contact their 
legislators to vote down this measure, which would 
enable deep packet inspection of communications 
on the Internet.
An Extrapolated Ideology
The Anonymous hacker collective draws from 
various elements of popular culture in order to 
elicit support from the larger population and to 
pull off their various operations. While their ac-
tions do apparently draw from Wark’s The Hacker 
Manifesto and from V is for Vendetta, the group 
seems to be even more responsive to real-world 
news and a worldview of keeping the Internet 
free from government interference of any kind. 
Their ideology is a flexible one that evolves with 
the world’s issues and events. As such, it must be 
understood as a malleable entity defined by the 
(active) members of the organization.
Theirs is also not an all-encompassing doc-
trine concerned with humanity’s external and 
internal well-being, the state of his soul or spirit, 
human livelihoods, but rather, a sliver of human 
concerns—related to human freedoms from gov-
ernment controls and the freeing of information 
from others’ control.
At one end of the continuum, the Anonymous 
hacktivist collective seems to subscribe to a form 
of extreme libertarianism. While Propertar-
ian libertarians suggest that there should be no 
violence against private property, this hacktivist 
collective apparently takes a non-propertarian 
libertarian approach in that their role is to abol-
ish authoritarian institutions that control various 
means of production and subordinate the majority 
to the property-owning class. At the far end of the 
spectrum are the anarchists who profess no use 
for government even in a limited sense and so 
challenge all levers of government power head-on.
Definition by negation may be illustrative here 
as well. As an ideology, theirs is secular, non-
theological, non-religious, or a-religious. There 
is nothing here that is particularly transcendent. 
Much is left to silence, unaddressed. The progress 
that is promised is economic. By implications, 
humans may advance with more access to pro-
tected information.
The only universality is that of a practical lived 
world in which the group pursues the unleashing 
of the power of information and ideas—through 
illicit means, which do not respect the rights of 
governments or of private industry. Their tenets 
focus around the action of the hack and artful 
deception to achieve their aims. (In a way, the 
methods define the group.) It alludes to a past 
and a present in which those with the power—the 
Man—would deny others access to the liberat-
ing freedom from released information. This 
Anonymous ideology promises a kind of altruistic 
participation in a larger cause without necessarily 
conveying an identity. After all, to belong in the 
inner circle would require a rare skill set. To belong 
to the periphery may be as simple as clicking on a 
button to participate in a virtual takeover that may 
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leave the illusion of achieving an aim without cost 
and without law enforcement knowledge. This act 
may give the illusion of empowerment, at least 
for a brief moment.
The “End of History” 
According to Anonymous?
What would a utopian ideal under an Anonymous 
ideology look like, if taken to an extreme logical 
end conclusion? In this thought experiment, all 
information would be “free.” There would be no 
secrets, nothing protected, no “security” around 
information. People would share what they invent, 
if they chose to invent. People would be liber-
ated. There would be no governments to struggle 
against. Without the hierarchies of information, 
people would theoretically be classless. People and 
entities might be more accountable with everything 
known or knowable, or would they be more blasé 
to the revelations of each other? With no structured 
governance, how would people socially organize? 
With no private ownership of information, would 
other property rights also disintegrate? (Would 
people be able to own property or land or mon-
eys, for example?) Would they connect virtually 
through their various computing machines? Would 
this end mean the end of the hacker, with nothing 
to hack? Does Anonymous only exist in symbiosis 
with the extant power structures of nation-states 
and multi-national companies? Would this mean 
a surplus from abstraction, and what would that 
surplus look like and mean? If this were the “end 
of history,” would it be a desirable state? Would it 
be practical? Would it align with human nature, as 
people know it to be? (The “thought experiment” 
here may be too heavy of a stress test on a nascent 
ideology, but there is a value in trying to visualize 
what an ideology may look like put into extreme 
practice—even though the real world often moves 
to “contain” such ideologies and practices that 
challenge the larger system).
Figure 5, “A Wordle Tag Cloud of the Anony-
mous Hacker Collective’s Wikipedia Page,” offers 
a simple text analysis to gain a sense of the popular 
recurrences of terms on that page. The URL used 
for this particular tag cloud was http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Anonymous_%28group%29.
This tag cloud shows the predominance of the 
group’s name over any of its specific issues—
which are referred to in much smaller text. The 
organization’s reputation is very high profile and 
possibly much more outsized than any one attack 
or another. This may show the predominance of 
the meme. In one microbial analogy, while orga-
nizations have life cycles and beginnings and ends, 
memes may be more like latent endospores that 
may exist many hundreds (or eternities) of years 
in the environment and not have expression in a 
host until they are picked up and activated (po-
tentially pathogenically). Aspirants or new con-
verts to a group (known colloquially as “wan-
nabe’s” or want-to-be’s) tend to take more risks 
to prove their mettle (to signal their new identity 
and commitment) and may be instigated to take 
part in ever more virulent attacks to increase their 
chances of acceptance by the in-group. Periph-
eral group members tend to experience more group 
loyalty if they anticipate future acceptance; pe-
ripheral group members tend to experience less 
group loyalty if they anticipate future rejection 
(Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie, 
2003). Those who are insecure in their in-group 
identity tend to react more extremely to in-group 
members who are seen as disloyal because of their 
foundational insecurity and to out-group members 
who might challenge that identity (Branscombe, 
Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1995). The social costs 
of misidentification with an out-group (such as 
law enforcement) could have high negative reper-
cussions on a virtual group member. Further, in 
virtual groups, those minimal groups who are 
brought into subgroup assignments tend to expe-
rience greater in-group vs. out-group identification 
(Wang, Walther, & Hancock, 2008), which sug-
gests that tasked individuals may emotionally 
relate more closely to the virtual organization.
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Figure 6, “A Wordle Tag Cloud of Anonymous 
in the Twitter Verse,” highlights some of the terms 
that are popular in relation to micro-blogging 
about the Anonymous group at that particular time 
slice. What is trending may very much relate to a 
current news story or public release by the group 
or some other factor. These words refer to some 
of the mystique of the organization, referring to 
“secret” and the National Security Agency (NSA), 
the hyper-secretive U.S. signals intelligence or-
ganization. The URL used in this particular tag 
cloud is http://twitter.com/#!/anonymousirc.
In the Twitterverse, Anonymous involves a 
broad range of trending issues. It is a relevant 
organization that has sparked broad conversations 
about the roles of the Internet, information, and 
government. Figure 7, “A Screenshot of the Twit-
ter Feeds Related to AnonymousIRC” provides a 
sense of the user interface for this group and a 
sense of the brief discourses.
In the Internet universe, an event has not oc-
curred if it is not present somehow in the elec-
tronic space. In that sense, Anonymous has left 
tracks on the public track and also much in private 
spaces. In Internet time, much of these will have 
changed, and other operations will have come to 
the fore.
Another analysis, enabled by NodeXL (from 
the Social Media Research Foundation), shows a 
network of social microbloggers that is intensely 
concentrated in terms of relationships, with 
some pendant nodes on the periphery. Figure 8, 
“Anonymous Hacker Community by Tweeting 
Interests (per NodeXL and using a Harel-Koren 
Fast Multiscale Algorithm),” shows 836 vertices 
(individual nodes) that have recently “Tweeted” 
Figure 5. A Wordle tag cloud of the Anonymous hacker collective’s Wikipedia page
Figure 6. A wordle tag cloud of Anonymous in the Twitterverse
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about the Anonymous Hacker collective. This 
sampling was taken during a time when there are 
efforts against the Syrian regime in the Syrian 
civil war (in terms of a publicized Anonymous 
operation). The algorithm used to display the 
graph results is the Harel-Koren Fast Multiscale 
view. This search was conducted with a maximum 
limit of 1,000 nodes for both efficiency of search 
and for manageability of the data.
The visualization shows an intense complex 
of interactive nodes in the dark area at the center 
of this network and multiple other spinoff groups 
with other centers (or influential nodes). An-
other visualization of the same data may be done 
using a Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm.
Figure 9 shows more of some central influential 
nodes which connect to many on the periphery. 
This visualization is from the same data. The graph 
metrics for the Figures 8 and 9 visualizations are 
shown in Table 1, “Graph Metrics for the “Anony-
mous Hacker” Twitterverse in December 2012.
In terms of reciprocated “following” of each 
other’s microblogs, the network seems fairly 
distributed, without many mutual connections. 
This could suggest that the information about the 
Figure 7. A screenshot of the Twitter feeds related to AnonymousIRC
Figure 8. Anonymous hacker community by tweet-
ing interests (per NodeXL and using a Harel-Koren 
fast multiscale algorithm)
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Anonymous Hacker collective appeals to many 
separately from mass media and social media 
coverage, and they are each communicating with 
their various smaller networks and social groups. 
This shows something about the appeal of the 
Anonymous message. The largest cluster consists 
of 113 in one group based on the sharing of the 
140-character messages. The graph is very low 
in terms of density, at 0.00024783.
Ironically, if this collective is pushing for 
more open-access to information, their actions are 
sparking pushback from private sector companies 
that are calling for a “collective defense” of this 
information commons (Charney, 2010) and more 
stringent controls on the Internet. In the military 
and government vein (public sector), countries are 
calling for a cyber counter-insurgency strategy. 
While offensive capabilities are constantly chang-
ing, so far defensive ones, and where vulnerabili-
ties occur is where there are serious or temporal 
gaps in the defense. With some two billion people 
online, a range of vulnerabilities are possible for 
the civilian unhardened targets.
CONCLUSION
In 2011, hacktivists conducted only 3 percent of 
855 data breaches investigated (and 174 million 
compromised records lost) but in those breaches 
stole more than 58% of the compromised data for 
the year (with criminals pursuing funds accounting 
for the rest) (Rashid, 2012). Even so, data theft is 
a relatively new expression of protest.
Prior to March 31, 2012, Anonymous prom-
ised to take-down the Internet by attacking its 
root servers handling the Domain Name System 
or “DNS” (the core of the Web’s infrastructure 
that help link URLs to the actual servers); that 
date came and went without noticeable incident 
(Sengupta, 2012). However, if anything, that 
showed that the organization has an ambition 
for “spectacular” hacks that would trump prior 
hacks—as is suggested in escalation theory in 
the International Relations (IR) literature. The 
Figure 9. Anonymous hacker community by 
tweeting interests (per NodeXL and using a 
Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm)
Table 1. Graph metrics for the “Anonymous 
Hacker” Twitterverse in December 2012 
Graph Type Directed
Vertices 836
Unique Edges 775
Edges With Duplicates 569
Total Edges 1344
Self-Loops 1088
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio 0.011695906
Reciprocated Edge Ratio 0.023121387
Connected Components 668
Single-Vertex Connected Components 635
Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component 113
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component 411
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter) 6
Average Geodesic Distance 2.292391
Graph Density 0.00024783
Modularity Not Applicable
NodeXL Version 1.0.1.229
Readability Metric Value
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tendency towards outsized claims has affected 
spinoff organization LulzSec, which has claimed 
to “backdoor” a software company’s anti-virus, 
which the company denies. Other attack claims 
have been made with no response by the target 
organization or business. An organization may be 
understood to comprise a wide range of factors. 
In the murky realms of the Internet, verification 
of claims may be hard to come by. Anonymous, 
LulzSec and AntiSec have been known to deface 
sites with false news stories (such as those includ-
ing Tupac Shakur being alive or Rupert Murdoch 
being found dead or a president of a Western nation 
having been assassinated). Given such standards 
of engaging the world, their method of making a 
statement undercuts their own veracity. Hoaxing 
has become such a part of the culture and actions 
of some hacktivist organizations that announce-
ments often come with reporter speculation that 
the assertion may well be a ploy.
On a more down-to-earth scale, an organization 
may be analyzed to understand its potency. Ideally, 
these would be questions posed at the beginning 
of the chapter and answered in the body text, but 
rather, the questions are posed here to show the 
severe limits to what is currently known about 
the organization.
Profiling the Hacker 
Collective/Organization
Some questions that may inform watchers of 
Anonymous involve the following:
• The Leadership
 ◦ What is the vision of the leadership of 
the organization?
 ◦ How is this vision expressed? How is 
that vision interpreted?
 ◦ What are the leadership capabilities 
of the organization’s leaders? Are 
they capable of rallying a broad range 
of people?
 ◦ How are targets selected?
 ◦ Is the leadership in control of the var-
ious fronts on which it is fighting?
• The Membership
 ◦ What are the self-identities of the 
participants of the group?
 ◦ How long do they tend to stay with 
this organization (their length of 
tenure)?
 ◦ What are main causes (motivations) 
for joining the group, and then for 
leaving the group?
 ◦ How strong is the commitment of the 
participants of the group?
 ◦ How is the membership trained up?
 ◦ How do members evolve? Do they 
“outgrow” the organization? What do 
they move to? Are they assimilated 
into the mainstream?
• Organizational Culture and Dynamics
 ◦ What sort of organization is this?
 ◦ What is the organizational culture? 
What informs this culture?
 ◦ What are its motifs? Its symbols? Its 
main values?
 ◦ How closely does the group hone to 
its stated values?
• Organizational Skill Sets
 ◦ What are the capabilities and skill 
sets of the organization’s leaders?
 ◦ What are the skill sets of the organi-
zation (the “followers”)?
• Organization Resources
 ◦ How well funded is the organiza-
tion? What are the resources of the 
organization?
 ◦ How coherent is the organization’s 
agenda? Who sets the agenda? How 
independent (vs. reactive) is the 
agenda?
 ◦ What contributions are provided to 
the organization by its followers (if 
any)?
• Information Flow
 ◦ Where does the organization get its 
information?
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 ◦ How does the organization release 
information?
 ◦ How does it communicate with its 
followers?
 ◦ How does the organization reach the 
media? How coherent is its message?
• Engagement with the Larger Publics
 ◦ How much support or buy-in does 
the organization have from the larger 
public?
 ◦ How appealing are the messages of 
the organization to the larger pub-
lic? What is the “soft power” of the 
organization?
• The Attacks and Operations
 ◦ How effective is the organization in 
projecting an independent, non-state-
based anarchic power?
 ◦ How much power does the organi-
zation have in creating real change? 
Or is the group fairly diversionary in 
approach?
 ◦ How persistent or sustainable are 
their operations?
 ◦ How technologically and socially 
and informationally sophisticated are 
their attacks?
 ◦ What combinations of tactics are 
used?
• Spin-Off Groups
 ◦ How inspiring is the original group?
 ◦ Who are allies with this organization?
 ◦ What are the spin-off groups that 
have derived from the original orga-
nization? How do these differ from 
the original organization?
The Organizational Ecosystem
Further, in terms of the environmental context 
for the group, it may help to consider some ad-
ditional questions.
• Are there natural limits to this organization 
in the environment?
• Who are the competitors to this 
organization?
• What can the government offer to potential 
followers of the group that the group can-
not offer, and vice versa? In the competi-
tion for the hearts and minds (and comput-
ers) of the general populace, what is being 
offered to the mainstream?
As of early 2012, there are concerns that this 
group will evolve capabilities within a few years 
to potentially attack the U.S. electronic grid and 
potentially cause harm to individual lives and 
critical physical infrastructures. There are specula-
tions on how the leadership may change in terms 
of “character in power” or character in any orga-
nizational circumstance, depending on how the 
law enforcement and cyber environment changes. 
Other concerns are that they will potentially bring 
in mercenaries with even greater capabilities 
than self-trained hackers. Prior hacks have been 
exploited by foreign intelligence agencies. Right 
now, there is insufficient information to speculate 
about the ranges of possibilities. However, it is 
also irresponsible to take away any possibilities 
from the range of conceptual possibilities on the 
one hand or to cast aspersions on this organiza-
tion, on the other.
While human and group motives are constantly 
evolving, private motives are often more complex 
and enduring than even publicly acknowledged 
ones. There may be hidden other motives that 
were not even considered in this work.
As it is, truth has to be conceptualized as a 
shimmer—with a wide range of potential reali-
ties. The action potential of a hacktivist group will 
change depending on a variety of factors—the 
ideologies, the leaderships, the capabilities of the 
group, and those of competitor groups and their 
targets. (If Wikileaks is any indication, the troubles 
of its leader have led to spinoff groups—like 
OpenLeaks—and a diminishment of the original 
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organization, which had an unstable funding 
structure [Domscheit-Berg, 2011].) An organiza-
tion informs its own history by interpreting that 
history, but it is also defined and informed by that 
history. Those external to the group—say, law 
enforcement, mainstream media, academics, and 
others—also have a voice in defining that history. 
If a hacker is defined by his or her hack, and if it is 
true that people are constantly striving for power (in 
whatever ways they may best express their power, 
according to various motivation theories), then 
one may assume that there is continuous upward 
pressure to top prior efforts—in order to show the 
organization’s resolution and to encourage more 
membership and participation. Activists have 
been using the Internet in more creative ways in 
terms of “intercreative texts, intercreative tactics, 
intercreative strategies, intercreative networks” 
(Meikle, 2010, p. 364).
As a meme, the Anonymous stance about 
the need for the freedom of information may be 
a universalist one, but the concepts may not be 
widely salient. As an archetype, Anonymous may 
fit the role of the trickster character, according to 
anthropologist Gabriella Coleman, who has been 
studying the group (Sengupta, 2012). Without a 
charismatic leader or an emotional appeal or even a 
“homeland” message, the ideology of Anonymous 
may not contain the seeds for wider participation. 
While this approach will go “viral” any time soon, 
it is clear that the fight with hackers and hacktivists 
is already a global fight for law enforcement. These 
are all speculations. Still, there is no denying that 
Anonymous is a critical player in the definition of 
the future of the Internet and the respective roles 
of information and its dispersion in the world. 
Most information systems are “secure enough 
(but insecure)” (Sandhu, 2012) because absolute 
security may be an impossibility. In the face of the 
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) of hacktivism 
to establishment systems, there is a value in setting 
this baseline understanding founded on the extant 
available information up to the present.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
0-Day Exploit: A vulnerability in a technol-
ogy system that is yet unknown by the software 
makers and system administrators (often very 
difficult to identify).
4chan: An Internet message/image (bulletin) 
board.
/b/: An electronic bulletin board.
Action Potential: After cell activation by a 
stimulus, the following change in an electrical 
impulse along a plasma membrane (of a muscle 
or nerve) in the transmission of nerve signals.
Air Gap: A physical disconnection between 
a computer network and the Internet, initially 
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thought to be capable of protecting an information 
system against compromise.
Anarchy: The lack of a government.
Ankle Biter: A neophyte, an amateur.
Anomic: Alienated, without a sense of direc-
tion or meaning.
Anonymous: Not unidentified by name; with-
out distinguishing features; impersonal; unknown.
Backdoor: A way to illicitly access network 
systems by bypassing normal authentication.
Blackhat Hacker: A hacker who hacks for 
malicious reasons, usually to cause damage.
Civil Disobedience: Purposeful non-com-
pliance with select laws as a non-violent form of 
political expression or protest.
Costly Signal: An indicator of an organiza-
tion’s type by a particular action that his risky to 
the organization, often to prove its resolve to a 
cause and its capabilities (an antonym to a “costly 
signal” is a “cheap talk” signal, which is cost-free 
to provide).
Creed: A formal statement of beliefs.
Cybotage: A form of cyber terrorism which 
involves the disruption and destruction of infor-
mation infrastructures, often for political aims.
Defacement: The purposeful harming of the 
appearance of a website, often through digital 
graffiti.
Denial of Service (DOS) Attack: An attack 
which involves the uses of many “drone” com-
puters to request service from a targeted website 
to overwhelm their servers to deny the servers’ 
provision of services to potential users.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) At-
tack: An attack that involves the takeover of many 
“drone” computers (multiple attack systems) to 
request service from a targeted website with the 
purpose of taking the site down (leading to service 
outages from the target website).
Domain Name System: The underlying sys-
tem that links names of websites to their Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses, enabling the location of 
the site.
Dox: A verb that means to “document” or 
identify the real people behind handles.
Drone: A machine that is remote-controlled; 
an unthinking and unpiloted computer.
Exploit: A compromise of a computing ma-
chine.
Forensics: The study of evidence on computers 
and digital storage media.
Gray Hat Hacker: A hacker who hacks com-
puters, software, and networks for both benevolent 
and malevolent reasons.
Hacker: A skilled person who breaks into 
computing systems and computers—for any range 
of purposes.
Hacktivism (Hacker + Activism): The uses 
of computers and computer networks to make 
political statements; a form of civil disobedi-
ence using computers and computer networks; a 
portmanteau of hacker and activism; electronic 
civil disobedience.
Honeypot: A virtual trap designed to be at-
tacked by hackers in order to learn about hacker 
strategies, tools, identities, and behaviors (a “honey 
net” is a simulated network for the same purposes 
as a “honey pot”).
Hybrid Attack: A hacker attack that uses 
multiple tactics to compromise systems.
Ideology: A set of ideas that may define goals, 
values, and actions of a (often political) group.
Image Board (also Imageboard): A chan-
nel, an internet form that focuses on the posting 
of images.
Internet Protocol Address (IP): A unique 
identifier to a particular computer connected to 
the Internet.
Internet Relay Chat (IRC): Real-time text 
messaging application.
Key Logger: A malicious type of software that 
may be used to “log” or record all the keystrokes 
of an individual using a computer, in order to ac-
cess their private accounts and other information.
92
Action Potentials
Kiddie Hack: A low-level hack using pub-
licly available tools (a derisive label indicating 
amateurism).
Libertarianism: A political philosophy that 
promotes as little government as possible to enable 
individual free will and decision-making.
Lulz: The plural form of “lol” or “laugh out 
loud”.
Manifesto: A public declaration of political 
principles and values.
Meme: A unit of cultural transmission, which 
may be ideas or practices or other forms.
Mercenary: An individual who sells his or 
her skills for money.
Microblogging: The Web logging of short 
messages usually limited to 140 characters, dis-
tributed in real time to the various “followers” of 
a particular individual or group.
Mirroring: The preservation and copying of 
a Web site in its original form.
Neologism: A newly created word.
Non-Propertarian Libertarianism: The 
philosophy that true human liberty requires the 
absence of any authority; this belief system rejects 
any authority of private property to the detriment 
of others.
Pen (Penetration) Attack: Successful unau-
thorized access to a protected system resource, 
usually information.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII): 
Information that serves as a unique identifier of 
an individual and can lead to a non-repudiatable 
naming of the person.
Phishing: An illegal elicitation of private 
information by taking on a false identity through 
electronic communications.
Propaganda: Information designed to influ-
ence people in regards to a political issue; per-
suasive communication to affect attitudes, ideas, 
and behaviors.
Pseudonymity: The maintenance of long-term 
anonymity; the state of not being identifiable for 
a long period of time.
Random Walk: A probabilistic trajectory 
based on observations and mathematical formu-
las but which offer a range of indeterminacy; an 
expression of a stochastic process.
Script Kiddies: A derogatory term referring 
to low-level hackers who are using simplistic 
methods.
Social Network: The connection of individuals 
through socio-technical spaces online; a branch 
of network science that focuses on human power 
relationships and the exchanges of resources and 
information.
Spear Phishing: A targeted (a known individu-
al or organization) fraudulent elicitation of private 
information through electronic communications.
SQL Injection Attack (SQLIA): The input-
ting of SQL statements in a Web form to extract 
the database contents or to send other commands 
to the server.
Tag Cloud: A text analysis tool that enables 
the display of words in a document or a website 
that calibrates the number of appearances of that 
word with the size of that word in a “tag cloud”; 
a type of visual informational-graphic.
Unique Identifier: A number or name that 
uniquely categorizes a particular digital or other 
object.
Web Log (“Blog” as a Portmanteau of “Web 
Log”): A Web journal, usually focused around a 
particular individual or personality, or topic.
Whitehat Hacker: A computer expert who 
hacks into computer systems in order to find 
weaknesses so that they may be addressed with-
out causing damage to the software maker or 
software users.
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APPENDIX 1
Extrapolating the Ideologies of the Anonymous Hacker 
Collective’s Spin-Offs: AntiSec and LulzSec
For virtual organizations that do not have a formal structure (except for the inner group of the leadership), 
very little research exists about how spinoffs occur. In this scenario, though, the Anonymous hacker 
collective has spun off two specialized organizations and movements in 2009 and 2011 respectively, 
some years after the organization initially became active with hacktivism in 2006: AntiSec and LulzSec.
Anti Security (AntiSec) 2009
A core element of Anonymous is reflected in the spin-off AntiSec movement or group. Initially, the 
Anti-Sec Movement (started in 1999) was about the eradication of full disclosure of computer system 
compromises and zero-day software exploits (as-yet unknown exploits) by cyber-security companies, 
which the hackers saw as an effort to instill fear and therefore raise profits for these particular companies. 
The original Anti-Sec movement took over the ImageShack site in order to post their manifesto, which 
decried the mirroring (copying and hosting) of hacked sites, as a way to raise money for profit-seeking 
corporations through the sales of firewalls, anti-virus software, and security auditing services. The 
neo-Anti Security Movement (“antisec” or “anti-sec”), as expressed through this Anonymous spin-off, 
is apparently about combating security efforts on the Internet as elements of totalitarian governments. 
Their media releases discussed fighting the high-level corruption of “profiteering gluttons” in terms of 
government and corporations. Foremost, they focused on what they call “the government and whitehat 
security terrorists across the world” (Diaz, 2011). Their own AntiSec image shows a monocle personae 
wearing a very black top hat.
They launched Project Mayhem (“pr0j3kt m4yh3m” in leetspeak) in 2009 as an attack against security 
communities (Astalavista and milwOrm and ImageShack). (“leetspeak” refers to “elite”—or a special 
cipher used online. “leet,” expressed as ‘1337,’ is an adjective to describe prowess or accomplishment, 
particularly in computer hacking. leetspeak appears in various media releases by the group, which asserts 
that it will ‘pwn’ or own or dominate various governments, corporations, or individuals).
The AntiSec wing of Anonymous undercut anonymous reporting of crime by compromising a law 
enforcement website in an operation termed “Shooting Sheriffs Saturday Release” which compromised 
70 U.S. law enforcement agencies’ sites and information (Mills, 2011).
A compromise of software giant Symantec involved the capture of its pcAnywhere source code. The 
hacker requested $50K in extortion to not release the code and then released it when that amount was 
not paid (Storm, 2012). This push for funding, again, is another recent innovation off of Anonymous 
activities—which earlier decried any entrepreneurial or monetary-gain aspect. Was this extortion attempt 
the work of a renegade or a change in organizational tactics?
The OpAntiSec banner has enabled a range of highly focused campaigns against particular organi-
zations with actual and symbolic value in the neo-AntiSec agenda. While the ambitions are broad, and 
there have been some severe and expensive compromises ranging in the hundreds of millions of dollars 
of damage, the sophistication of the various hacks are not technologically that difficult.
With the 2011 passage of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) treaty and proposed 
Protect IP Act (PIPA), the AntiSec hackers promised to “bring a fu**ing mega-uber-awesome war that 
rain torrential hellfire down on all enemies of free speech, privacy and Internet freedom”.
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Lulz Security (LulzSec) 2011 -
While Anonymous members use terms like “guerrilla cyberwarfare” to describe their work, the origin of 
LulzSec (“LulzSecurity” with an earlier incarnation as Internet Feds—under Anonymous) might seem 
to be a return to the roots of Lulzy hacking or the joy at creating havoc or disruption. This group has 
released statements such as: “You find it funny to watch havoc unfold, and we find it funny to cause it” 
(Hoffman, 2011, p. 20). Their motto is the following: “Laughing at your security since 2011!” and their 
bio on Twitter read in part “the world’s leaders in high-quality entertainment at your expense.” Their 
microblogging Tweets are full of “Wink, wink, double wink!” Their website, which was created in June 
2011, plays the theme-song for Love Boat. Their ASCII-art banner of the LulzBoat (based on a pirate 
ship theme) shows that the organization is all about the “laugh out loud”s.
The work of this splinter group differed from mainline Anonymous hacktivism in the sense that they 
made the dumping of private information into the public realm a centerpiece of its work. This group 
(veterans of the infamous HBGary hack) fielded a small team of trusted hackers. They used an automated 
tool to scan the Internet for SQL-injection network vulnerabilities, and there was another open-source 
tool for downloading databases for easier analysis. This off-shoot focused on attacking .mil and .gov 
sites. Various hackers would send in floods of hacked network vulnerabilities, in pursuit of lulz but also 
acts of vengeance. Not all attacks or data releases were instigated from the central group of core hackers.
However, the targets of the attacks beginning with a two-month spree in May –June 2011 were high-
impact and high-attention ones. The earliest known hack attributed to the group began on May 5th, 2011, 
against Fox Broadcasting Company. The group released the X Factor contestants database with 73,000 
applicants’ personal information. Shortly thereafter, the Fox.com sales database was released. In May, 
2011, the U.S.-based Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) was hacked by LulzSec in retaliation for its 
Wikileaks documentary. A faked story about late rapper ` Tupac Shakur’s quiet living in a secret location 
was shared on the hacked site. This escapade was broadly trumpeted through social networking channels.
Another attack occurred in early June 2011 and involved the accessing of a U.S. Senate server and 
an attack on Bethesda Softworks, with the release of gamers’ identities and passwords (with a high risk 
of compromise for repeat passwords used on multiple accounts).
An attack on an FBI-linked network of cyber-technology specialists supporting national security called 
Infragard was attacked, and 180 passwords from the members were revealed. The organization focused 
on trying to interfere with FBI work and even made a hash tag called “#fuckfbifriday” to organize their 
Tweets. This new direction in hacking law enforcement drove away some of the hacker stalwarts who’d 
participated in earlier attacks for “lulz” and less for politics or challenging government. They compro-
mised Pron.com (a porn site) computers and revealed some 26,000 log-ins and passwords, many email 
addresses with .mil and .gov extensions. In June, LulzSec hacked the UK’s Serious Organized Crime 
Agency (SOCA) in retaliation for the arrests of some hackers.
A member of both Anonymous and LulzSec admitted in court in participating in an extensive hack of 
Sony Pictures Entertainment, which was said to have suffered $171 million in losses (Henderson, 2011) 
and others suggesting that the company would have to spend over a billion to shore up its systems and 
to pay out costs from lawsuits. The group broke into Nintendo in June 2011, but they limited the harm 
they caused because of a professed “fondness for the game console maker” (Henderson, 2011).
Law enforcement is a particular target of choice. In late June 2011, the group hacked and released 
information from the Cyberterrorism Defense Initiative’s Security and Network Training Initiative 
and National Education Laboratory (Sentinel program). The following image shows ASCII-text art 
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released with the attacks on Arizona law enforcement agents in response to what the members saw as 
anti-immigration laws and their enforcement. This attack in June 2011 leaked personal details of those 
in law enforcement. It came with a statement against “racial profiling anti-immigrant police state.” Ac-
cording to P. Olson, this trove of emails and files came from an activist who was not a core leader in 
LulzSec but a participant (2012, pp. 338 – 339). The release of these files caused consternation among 
the leadership, who did not want to cause increased risks to the police officers.
A DDOS attack on the C.I.A. for the laughs was the apparent reason for contact by Wikileaks founder 
Julian Assange, who requested that the group hack the Icelandic government’s sites as retaliation for 
their treatment of a journalist who supported Wikileaks (Olson, 2012, pp. 324 – 329). (Assange verified 
his identity by sending a link to a near-live video of himself sitting at the computer with the text of their 
IRC chat in the window on his laptop).
For all the publicity, this organization was losing its street credibility. The exploits into various net-
works—for “Fox, Sony, NATO, Senate.gov” were given to LulzSec by other hackers loosely affiliated 
with the group. LulzSec’s inner circle could claim only Infragard and PBS as their direct hacking victims 
(Olson, 2012, p. 343). Intermittent arrests of various members further dampened membership rolls, and 
the leadership themselves was starting to feel the pressure.
After two intense months of hacking and a last data dump of their electronic heists on June 25, 2011, 
the group claimed retirement at the end of June. On June 26, 2011, the group commemorated “50 days 
of lulz” and claimed that they had only intended to be active for 50 days from the beginning. In other 
accounts, this came about as a response to the arrests of some of the core leadership in multiple countries. 
According to an organizational press release, the group claimed only 6 members, which law enforcement 
charging documents seem to corroborate. Their new media savvy resulted in the group having more than 
283,000 followers on its Twitter feed when it first retired.
A group re-emerged as LulzSec Reborn on April 1, 2012 (April Fool’s Day), after many of its first-
generation core members were arrested by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies around the 
world—when it was revealed that the group’s titular head Sabu (Hector Xavier Monsegur) had been 
turned by the FBI and had helped identify the other group members (Sengupta, 2012); law enforcement 
intercepted hacker “finds” of various network vulnerabilities in order to warn corporations and orga-
nizations, so the vulnerabilities could be patched. (It was surmised in the aftermath of the arrests that 
Monsegur was used by the FBI to attract some of the world’s best hackers for arrest or recruitment by 
intelligence agencies or law enforcement.) These hackers face serious risks in their respective countries of 
citizenship and operations. In the U.S., a conspiracy charge may result in up to five years in prison, if the 
individual is convicted. Intentional damage to a protected computer may result in a maximum sentence of 
10 years in prison. Each charge comes with a potential $250,000 fine. Hacker arrests related to LulzSec 
occurred in the UK, Ireland, New York, and Chicago. Some cyber security experts have said that this 
new Anonymous is likely wholly new as the first group was rolled up in an FBI sting (Rubenking, 2012).
Hacker groups do not function in a competition-free environment. They are not only combating law 
enforcement with their outsized legal powers of information access, infiltration, subterfuge, access, and 
serious technology skills and tools. Hacker groups compete with other hackers and groups, who want 
to claim dominance, skills, and political righteousness. Loyal insiders may turn into outsiders and “en-
emies” based on a small disagreement. LulzSec members have been “doxed” and outed by rival hacker 
groups, such as TeaMp0isoN, KillerCube, BlaCkCat, Team Web Ninjas, The Jester (using th3j35t3r as 
his handle), Oneiroi, and m_nerva.
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The LulzBoat “Operation Anti-Security” manifesto reads like a call-to-action:
We encourage any vessel, large or small, to open fire on any government or agency that crosses their 
path. We fully endorse the flaunting of the word “AntiSec” on any government website defacement or 
physical graffiti art. ... To increase efforts, we are now teaming up with the Anonymous collective and 
all affiliated battleships.
Top priority is to steal and leak any classified government information, including email spools and 
documentation. Prime targets are banks and other high-ranking establishments. If they try to censor our 
progress, we will obliterate the censor with cannonfire anointed with lizard blood.
This “reborn” group broke into a dating site (MilitarySingles.com) for military personnel and re-
leased some 160,000 account details from their database (Constantin, 2012). Rupert Murdoch’s The Sun 
and The Times were hacked in July 2012. So too were the following: the government of Zimbabwe; the 
municipality of Mosman; and the government of Tunisia. In terms of corporate hacks, AT&T, Sony, 
Viacom, Disney, EMI, NBC Universal, and a Fox News Twitter account were all hacked. There were 
cyber-attacks in Austria and Italy. Of special concern to law enforcement were the attacks on NATO 
(with a gigabyte of private data released) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of the 
potential impact on national security and international economies (Hoffman, 2011). The U.S. Director 
of National Intelligence suggested that LulzSec’s incursions into NASDAQ and the International Mon-
etary Fund result in significant risks to national security infrastructures (Clapper, 2012, p. 7). Indeed, 
such hactivist organizations have engaged in calling for attacks on the U.S. “national infrastructure” and 
such rhetoric (Lee, 2012).
Monsanto was hacked in July 2012: “The group claimed they performed the attack to protest the 
company’s lawsuits against farmers who manufacture organic milk in an effort to stop them from stating 
on the label that their milk does not contain artificial Bovine Growth Hormones. Monsanto confirmed 
the attack but claimed that only about ten percent of the information published came from current or 
former employees of the company. They said that the other ninety percent were email addresses and 
names of media contacts and employees of other agricultural companies,” according to the “Operation 
AntiSec” Wikipedia entry.
In an escalatory innovation, the group used compromised financial information to make donations 
to various charitable causes with the credit card numbers of police officers’ compromised accounts.
This organization dumps the raw data en masse on data sharing sites (and piracy sites), but they do 
little in the way of analysis—only highlighting a few particular points of interest in Tweets or on their 
websites. At this point, it is unclear what the secondary or tertiary exploitations of this data may be. Some 
press reports have mentioned financial identities compromised, and others have mentioned exploitation 
by foreign intelligence services (“AntiSec hackers…,” Jan. 5, 2012).
The phenomenon of LulzSec is intriguing in two fundamental ways. One is the setup of Bitcoin to 
collect donations to fund its activities along. Anonymous did not have a clear publicly identifiable income 
stream, and it seemed like an out-of-pocket sort of endeavor for those who would participate under that 
group’s banner. Second, LulzSec itself has splintered into other groups—or spawned or inspired others. 
LulzRaft conducted hacks in Canada. LulzSec Brazil, a regional organization, hacked Brazilian govern-
ment sites and the large energy company Petrobras. Raising resources may strengthen the organization 
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even as if opens up potential further legal (criminal) liabilities for both the organization and its funders. 
The splintering off of its message and its hacking practices suggests that others continue to see hacktiv-
ism as a way of righting social wrongs. As has been observed, many of those hackers arrested in LulzSec 
and other Anonymous-related groups have been dispossessed young males who turned to breaking into 
establishment sites to find meaning, voice, and entertainment.
CONCLUSION
The “propaganda of the deed” of various hacktivist spin-offs from the Anonymous hacker collective 
reveals AntiSec and LulzSec as pursuing some aligned goals of disrupting the Establishment status quo 
of Internet security, intellectual property protections, and information privacy protections online. Their 
attacks on governments, corporations, law enforcement, and security firms show a clear disruption 
strategy and combined hacker tactics. The two hacker manifestos and the various public statements by 
these spinoff organizations indicate the thinking behind the various actions of the groups. While the 
targeting of Anonymous (the originating organization) covers a much wider range of potential interests 
and more global territory (in cyberspace), the spinoff organizations tend to have clearer ideologies and 
activating messages. One core value in hacking is that the hacker is the hack, and as the hacker evolves 
in virtuosity, he (or she—but much rarer) will express that capability in more sophisticated ways to send 
a message to the world. An ideology provides an animating raison d’etre for various groups, but it also 
evolves as the group’s leadership and membership evolves. In that light, it is critical to monitor both the 
ideologies and the actions to understand the direction and capabilities of the hacktivist groups.
An ideology provides an animating raison d’etre for various groups, but it also evolves as the group’s 
leadership and membership evolves. In that light, it is critical to monitor both the ideologies and the 
actions to understand the direction and capabilities of the hacktivist groups. Closer monitoring of these 
spin-off groups, interviews with their arrested leaders, conducting text analyses of conversations between 
the followers, and even more formalizing querying of the group’s leaders and followers may reveal deeper 
insights about the groups’ ideologies. While the original Anonymous purposefully claimed to have no 
ideology, their spin-off organizations are somewhat less doctrinaire on this point, which has enabled 
this early look at their nascent animating ideology.
It will be important also to see if these ideologies, which inspire up to tens of thousands to take part 
in DDoS and DoS attacks by turning over their computers as drones offer some constraints on the ac-
tions of the members of the groups. In the case of Anonymous, the distributed and virtual nature of the 
collective has meant that various cyber attacks may be seen as not only contravening their own ideology 
(such as by shutting down the free speech of others, such as reporters in mainstream media) but also 
resulting in factions that take opposite sides of an issue and who hack and counter-hack each other. The 
cyber skirmishes among various factions of the hacktivist community are well documented, with the 
tools of social engineering and hacking brought to bear against each other (Olson, 2012). Meanwhile, 
members of the hacker groups are being “doxed” by law enforcement and brought into various legal 
systems for their day in court.
It may be that law enforcement may be the only ones who are watching these spinoff groups closely, 
and it’s not likely that any will be revealing methods or insights into the public realm for some time yet 
(while investigations are on-going). Academics are limited to what is available legally and publicly and 
within the capabilities of current technologies. It may be that tools written to scrape the so-called Dark 
Web may surface other insights about AntiSec and LulzSec.
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APPENDIX 2
Code Politics: The Pirate Party and European Political Structures
Introduction
By definition, a “disruptive” technology is one that challenges the current order, whether political or 
economic or social. By any measure, the popularization of the Internet and WWW in the past two de-
cades has meant challenges to the status quo on all three fronts. One example of this involves the battle 
over information and who should or should not have access to it. WikiLeaks has been pushing for the 
release of secret information in order to hold governments accountable. Anonymous and its spinoff or-
ganizations have pushed for government and corporate accountability and free information. The Pirate 
Bay has used technologies to enable the distributed exchange of unauthorized media content sharing 
and downloads. So far, such groups have functioned globally but on the fringes of illegality. A move 
by the Pirate Bureau in Sweden in 2006 resulted in the establishment of a political party advocating 
a technology-infused agenda, and in the intervening years, the Pirate Party has involved presences on 
all continents and over 40 countries, with its branch parties enabled by networking. Pirate Parties have 
added other policy planks: civil rights; direct democracy; government transparency; the freedom of 
information, and network neutrality.
These political developments indicate a shift in strategy by using the democratic process in order 
to publicize a political ideology and agenda. This sidebar offers a light analysis of the Pirate Party and 
some possible implications for the global order. Namely, it will focus on the following questions:
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This party is the first global supranational political party with presences in numerous countries with 
an ideology based on a mix of anarchist concepts, information piracy values, anti-corporatist approaches, 
and radical open-source concepts. Their combined membership rolls number in the tens of thousands. The 
policy package promised by this group involves privacy for individuals and open access to information 
with the dismantling of corporatist- and government-based intellectual property protections.
If anything, this shows that the digital piracy ideas may have some traction. Some suggest that the 
social norms around intellectual property protections are much more liberal than the extant laws (Svens-
son & Larsson, 2012). Further, its proponents have sufficient sophistication to amplify their ideas across 
many countries and to win adherents globally.
Research Questions: What is the platform of the Pirate Party in Europe? Who are its stakeholders, 
funders, and main supporters? What change is it trying to bring about? How does it use information and 
communications technology (ICT) to promote its ideologies? Who are its main rivals?
The International Pirate Party and its Founding
The human enchantment with the Internet and WWW may be seen in early publications about it, when 
the medium was depicted as somehow transcendent. In cyberspace, people could explore wholly new 
identities; interact and problem-solve in global communities; share knowledge; “crowd-source” ideas, 
and immerse in sci-fi realities (Holeton, 1998). Online, people could find meaning. While many of these 
ideas have dissipated with time, the concept of free information (and “information wants to be free”) 
has been more resilient.
Yochai Benkler (2006), in the print and free e-book Wealth of Networks, made the case that digital 
production enabled nearly costless re-distribution after the marginal cost of creation of the original product. 
Digital products are non-exclusive and non-consumable, so scaling up the distribution of various digital 
goods may result in a beneficial surplus for people. MacKenzie Wark (2004, 2006) offered his Hacker 
Manifesto, which collects a hodge-podge of revolutionary rhetoric to describe the content producers who 
are taken advantage of by the vectoralist class (which owns the mediums of communications); hackers 
free the abstracted surplus value from such inventions and improve the lived experiences of the general 
public. This is an anti-capitalistic approach that advocates resistance against globalization and the world 
economic system. Some have gone so far as to call this the “New Socialism,” which advocates a com-
munal core in digital culture. Here, technological tools are seen to reshape human minds and ways of 
interacting (Kelly, 2009). Finally, there is the idea of the need for information that may save people. Neal 
Stephenson in Cryptonomicon (1999) wrote of protected “data havens” being set up to enhance people’s 
survivability in a challenging world. (People engage in sense-making of the world around them, and their 
overlays of understandings of various technological phenomena are fully to be expected).
Technologists followed through with actions. In 1983, Richard Stallman sparked the free software 
movement with the “GNU is Not Unix” license. Lawrence Lessig, Hal Abelson, and Eric Eldred created 
the Creative Commons licensure for releasing digital contents into the public commons. A number of 
search engines enable free searching of open-source contents.
A range of technologies have been deployed that enable the actualization of some of these concepts. 
Various anonymizers enable some shielding of personal identities as people access information (and/
or break into sites). Hacking, malware, spoofing, phishing (and spear-phishing), and social engineering 
strategies have been used in concert to access privy information from governments and corporations. 
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Rogue sites have published out or “leaked” various types of copyrighted or protected data. High-level 
encryption regimes have been made available in open-source ways to protect data from some govern-
ments. While content creating companies have been deploying various sorts of Digital Rights Manage-
ment (DRM) regimes, most of these are broken by hackers and the tools used for the breaking are made 
available on the Internet. “Torrent” sites have enabled individuals to access unauthorized large-size 
(megabytes and terabytes) digital contents (software, movies, games, music, electronic books, and other 
digital contents) from distributed collections and computers through peer-to-peer file sharing. Intellectual 
piracy has some cachet among certain demographic groups.
One analyst suggests that modern-day digital pirates are informed by a mix of historical and cultural 
depictions of pirates. Land (2007) writes:
Whilst a certain image of piracy has been commodified, another more oppositional and insurgent figure 
of piracy has carried over from this period to disrupt contemporary regimes of accumulation both through 
the practices of digital piracy and through anti-capitalist protest. Both of these forms of contemporary 
organization carry with them the proto-anarchist ideology of autonomy, equality and community that 
the pirates of the golden age pioneered and which are still articulated today under the banner of Jolly 
Roger (Land, 2007, p. 170). 
Indeed, modern day digital pirates (under the names of The Pirate Bay, LulzSec, and others) do use 
self-referential pirate flags.
In Sweden, The Piracy Bureau (Piratbyran) came into being in the Summer of 2003. It was a com-
munity space for the Swedish hacker scene and Internet radio broadcasting community. It was concep-
tualized as a think tank about cyber issues. The group presented lectures, public discussions, and online 
events—to publicize their interests. One of the group’s members, Gottfrid Svartholm, originated the 
Pirate Bay in November 2003 (Li, 2009).
The Pirate Bay as a site where people download a client onto their computers. Through this, they may 
find search The Pirate Bay’s list of available files for download and access these “torrents” by extracting 
many segments of a file simultaneously from multiple computers for ease of download in a data swarm 
(Reynolds, 2010). BitTorrent maintains metainfo files (usually files with a .torrent extension) of avail-
able contents. A central tracker identifies the computers running the software which have particular files 
and enables the sharing. “With the Bittorrent system, the central server need not ever have access to the 
original file being uploaded by the user,” observes one author (Li, 2009, pp. 286 – 287). Simultaneous to 
their downloading, a downloader’s computer is also pushing out contents to others, with their computers 
acting as both clients and servers.
Essentially, intellectual pirates seem to accept the foundational concept that the author of a work is 
its first owner (Perry & Margoni, 2010, p. 621), but concepts diverge from there.
In January 2006, the Swedish Pirate Party (Piratpartiet) was founded. One has called it “the first 
political party that works on a global level” (Arsov, 2010) and certainly the first in the Internet Age 
inspired by some of the free and open principles spawned by the Net. The Piratpartiet’s stated platform 
involved three main issues:
1.  The fundamental reform of the Copyright System;
2.  The abolition of the Patent System; and
3.  Respect for personal privacy (Li, 2009, pp. 289 – 290).
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The Piratpartiet asserts that the current copyright regime goes too far to protect the commercial 
interests of publishers to the detriment of the consumers. In this light, they want to decriminalize the 
file sharing of copyrighted contents. Some advocates suggest that a “pay-per society” may emerge, with 
pervasive fees for virtually all contents. There is a sense that there are social benefits to open-sharing of 
cultural artifacts balanced against the harm to copyright holders (Van Eijk, Poort, & Rutten, 2010). The 
Pirate Party suggests that copyright itself should only last five years. They want to see an end to digital 
rights management systems and contractual restrictions on copyrighted materials. Finally, they suggest 
that government filtering of messages, surveillance techniques (like web beacons), and other efforts, 
may be used to try to track copyright infringers—but also regular private communications—which they 
see as a risk to common citizens. Citizens should have a right to anonymity, they assert. They should 
not be trackable using Personally Identifiable Information (PII) on the Internet. Advocates of the Pirate 
Party stance suggest that there are risks of a “digital enclosure” in which surveillance is common, and 
a panopticon (where everything is known in a surveillance society) as described in Mark Andrejevic’s 
ISpy (2007) may emerge.
The Piratpartiet’s anti-copyright and anti-DRM stance goes against a range of extant international 
treaties: the Berne Convention (1887), signed by Sweden in 1904, and the Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights or TRIPS treaty, required as part of membership to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (1994). Such treaties work to harmonize Intellectual Property (IP) laws. This political party’s 
stance also contradicts a number of Sweden’s and the European Union’s Copyright Laws (affirmed by 
the EU’s Court of Justice of the European Community).
In practice, though, people who would access copyrighted materials without permission did so without 
much in the way of punishment.
In principle, copyright in Sweden has always meant that it was forbidden to share protected material on 
the internet without the consent of the rights holder. However, it has been very difficult to punish those 
who engage in this kind of activity, since in practice it has not proved possible to identify individual 
file-sharers. The absence of functioning legal tools, surveillance, and sanctions has contributed to the 
development within society of a large measure of acceptance of this type of crime, and, quite simply, 
people have not taken this law seriously (Svensson & Larsson, 2012, p. 4). 
The European Union’s Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED law) further af-
firmed these intellectual property (patent and copyright) laws, with a focus on online infringements. 
The law’s passing resulted in an 18% drop in Swedish internet traffic in the six months following the 
passage of this law Increased sales of physical music by 27% and digital music by 48% (Ademon & 
Liang, 2010, p. 1). The law had no significant effects on theater ticket sales or the sales of DVD mov-
ies, showing that illegal downloads substituted for some purchases of physical and digital music but 
not so much in terms of theater and DVD movies. (To contextualize broadly, BitTorrent’s multi-source 
streaming is responsible for a large amount of Internet traffic. Sandvine’s Fall 2011 report on Global 
Internet phenomena observed that BitTorrent accounted for 20 – 50% of all upstream traffic and .07 to 
.17% of all downstream traffic based on geographical regions during peak periods (Han, Kim, Chung, 
Kwon, Kim, & Choi, 2012, p. 77)).
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If legislators were hoping that laws would work as a forcing function in terms of changing culture, 
they did not see any changes in the near-term. The EU IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC did not 
much change the social norms for file sharing in Sweden. Even in the six months after the IPRED law, 
few felt social pressure to stop illegally accessing copyrighted files (Svensson & Larsson, 2012, p. 13). 
The before- and after-surveys bracketing the IPRED law did not show much difference in social attitudes. 
What surveys found was that if enforcement were shored up, then free-riding downloaders would be 
less likely to help themselves.
The EU focused on shoring up the legal structures protecting copyright among its member states. 
Contemporaneously, the various countries’ law enforcement were acquiring the skills to start pursuing 
IP pirates.
However, other legislation also affects the enforcement of copyright, such as the Data Retention Directive 
(Directive 2006/24/EC, 2006), while copyright is also involved in different legislative procedures such 
as the European Telecoms Reform Package and the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement, ACTA (Larsson, 
2011b). The overarching goal within the EU is to harmonize the national legislation of the different EU 
Member States with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT), thereby achieving 
greater control over the use of the internet. This is considered to be essential, if the objective is to support 
copyright owners in their fight against illegal file sharing. In addition, copyright holders’ representatives 
are being given legal tools that allow violators to be identified. There is also a trend towards allocating 
greater responsibility to internet service providers for the type of content that is transmitted through 
their infrastructure (Svensson & Larsson, 2012, p. 2).
Fund-Raising Endeavors
The Pirate Party launched Relakks, a commercial darknet service that cost €5 a month to access encrypted 
private networks that enable the distribution of contents with relative anonymity from detection and 
surveillance (Paul, 2006). Darknet is a protocol layer that exists on current networks to enable a range 
of silent or semi-anonymous actions, such as peer-to-peer sharing. [The lack of so-called “endpoint ano-
nymity” had been a risk to many downloaders for years (Biddle, England, Peinado, & Willman, 2002), 
with potential traceability by both commercial and government entities.] This service was set up to fund 
the political activities of the Pirate Party.
Another fund-raising effort was started in early 2007, albeit by The Pirate Bay, to buy its own “na-
tion” based on the concept of a “data haven” that would be a “pirate utopia”:
The target of the proposed acquisition was a self-proclaimed independent state named Sealand. Perched 
atop an old World War II anti-aircraft gun emplacement long since abandoned by the British military, 
Sealand had been inaugurated by an Essex fisherman and part-time pirate radio entrepreneur, Roy 
Bates, in the late 1960s. Bates had originally intended to use the platform as a base for a revived pirate 
broadcasting effort, but in the end that plan had fizzled, and successive efforts to come up with some 
other way of making the ‘principality’ a going concern had been little more successful. The latest scheme 
had been to make it a data haven. In 2000, Westminster seemed set to legislate for all ISPs to be brought 
under the purview of official investigators. Sealand saw an opportunity in the move, and announced 
that it would offer a venue for anyone wanting to issue material to the Internet beyond the reach of any 
such state oversight. Its London-based commercial arm, named HavenCo, invited applications (Johns, 
2009, p. 44). 
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This endeavor came to nothing, and the funds raised were insufficient for a serious bid (Johns, 2009, 
p. 45).
In 2007, the Pirate Party launched a youth organization, known as the Young Pirates. The organiza-
tion’s power base in Sweden was not in urban areas, per se, but in “provincial towns around Sweden as 
Tidaholm and Markaryd, but also small university cities as Lund and Uppsala” (Demker, 2008, p. 18). 
The party advocated a variant of liberal individualism: people have privacy rights and rights to informa-
tion. Further, they asserted that “immaterial rights should be abandoned” (Demker, 2008, p. 18).
Content creating corporations—particularly those in movies and music—had been working for 
years to push through legislation to protect their interests. They went to the Supreme Court in MGM v. 
Grokster, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005) to establish third-party liability for “inducing” infringement. (Already 
on the books were laws related to vicarious and contributory liabilities. It is illegal to publicly perform 
unauthorized licensed contents. Further, there have been efforts to make linking to unauthorized stream-
ing contents illegal (Lunardi, 2009).) While the case was ultimately remanded, the justices made it clear 
that they saw some liability in third parties that enabled the compromise of copyright (Radcliffe, 2006).
The Pirate Bay, hosted in Sweden, was raided by the Swedish police on May 31, 2006. Swedish law 
enforcement was under pressure to act by the U.S. government and the Motion Picture Association, the 
international branch of the U.S.-based Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). The site reappeared 
only three days after the raid. (The Pirate Bay site is still up and functioning at http://thepiratebay.se/.)
However, the raid resulted in the Pirate Bay doubling the number of its users due to media attention, 
and the membership of the Piratpartiet went up by thousands (Li, 2009). The Pirate Party has been labeled 
a “virtue party” based on its ideological platform with “utopian goals.” None of the party’s founders had 
any parliamentary experience (Demker, 2008, p. 17).
In the 2006 elections in Sweden, the Pirate Party won 34,918 votes or 0.63% of the voting population. 
It placed one elected member in the parliament. It became known as the “third largest political group 
now represented within Sweden’s parliament” (Li, 2009, p. 289) and the fourth largest political party in 
Sweden. It was both a social movement of digerati and copyright liberalists as well as a political party.
In April 2009, the four individuals supporting The Pirate Bay in Sweden were found to be in breach 
of the Copyright Act. They were handed down a year’s imprisonment and a fine of $4.5 million (Reyn-
olds, 2010).
The Impact of the Pirate Party on Various European 
Countries and their Political Systems
The Pirate Party has presences in a number of other countries in the European Union and around the 
world. (The German Pirate Party (Pratenpartei) was founded in 2006 and modeled after the Swedish 
Pirapartiet. In the 2009 German general election, it garnered 2% of the vote. In 2011, in the Berlin state 
elections, The Pirate Party won 8.9% of the votes and first-ever seats in a state parliament and have 
gained representation on every German state parliament since then (North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland, 
and Schleswig-Holstein), with about 8% of the votes. (“Pirate Parties International,” Nov. 1, 2012)) The 
Pirate Party International was founded in Brussels at the PPI Conference on April 18, 2010.
One may conceptualize governments and commercial companies promoting physical and intellectual 
property rights. One organization tracks the international property rights of 125 countries annually based 
on similar measures. These 125 countries cover 97% of the world’s peoples. A 2010 report of the world’s 
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International Property Rights Index (IPRI) shows much of Europe listed in the top quintile for enforcing 
property rights, but some of its countries show only in the mid-range (along with countries like China). 
Those protecting intellectual property are seen as some of the powers arrayed against the Pirate Parties.
According to the International Property Rights Index, Sweden is #2 in the world in terms of its 
property rights ranking (higher than the U.S. at 15). So far, no known nation-state has capitulated to the 
agenda of this party, based on a review of the literature. Mounted against these parties are the extensive 
powers of state: their laws, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, surveillance capabilities, and media 
access. It is highly unlikely that the Pirate Party (in any country) will be more than an ephemeral political 
phenomenon given the hard-won protections for property rights in many regions of the world.
The high costs of Research and Development (R&D) for corporations mean that if patents and copy-
rights no longer exist, these companies will lack the funding streams to actually innovate with educated 
and trained professionals and the quality assurance regimes in place. (If the world described by The 
Pirate Party were created, one could imagine a “tragedy of the commons” phenomena occurring—with 
individuals taking advantage of what is free but contributing little to its actual upkeep. A study of Wiki-
pedia has shown that the power law is in play, with a few contributed inordinately much, but a majority 
of users just free-riding that resource.) Governments have a vested interest in protecting their respective 
economies, and those that serve as illegal data havens will likely find themselves constrained by the 
legal regimes around the world. Law enforcement agencies have become much more adept at working 
through the global bureaucracies that protect global trade from counterfeits, and the same bureaucratic 
levers will be employed to protect digital goods. Identities on the Internet and WWW are eminently 
trackable through Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and it will be very difficult to set up digital 
shops to distribute unauthorized digital contents without being identified, blacklisted, and shut down, if 
not also prosecuted. While individuals may ardently access copyrighted goods, as free riders, most will 
not likely be willing to suffer sanctions in order to access such materials (in a cost-benefit consideration).
CONCLUSION
This is not to say that in the struggles over information and privacy that those who are sympathetic to 
the Pirate Party’s agenda will not occasionally win skirmishes.
The popularization of the Pirate Party shows the global connectivity of the Social Web, which enables 
collaborations and political organization around motivating ideas in a globalized way. Those who are 
self-declared rebels against the established order, the capitalist status quo, have a range of electronic 
communications tools at hand to promote their ideas and actions. That they would pursue legitimate 
elected power simultaneous with their appeals to the broad masses and their darknet efforts shows so-
phistication in their political advocacy and activism.
Finally, while the social norms and cultures of the European Union seem to be lined up for free and 
open-source access to digital contents, the legal levers and leaders seem aligned against IP pirates. Un-
less they can bring some powerful allies alongside and field as-yet-unknown technologies, their cause 
will not likely progress beyond the present.
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